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THE ALLURE AND ILLUSION OF PARTNERS’ INTERESTS
IN A PARTNERSHIP
Bradley T. Borden*

Favorable tax treatment and management flexibility make tax
partnerships very popular. For starters, tax partnerships, unlike tax
corporations, are not subject to entity-level taxes. Partnership taxable
income flows through to the partners, and the partners report their
shares of partnership taxable income on their individual tax returns.
Partnership tax allocation rules determine the partners’ shares of
partnership taxable income. Those rules rely upon the alluring
concept of partners’ interests in a partnership. It seems intuitive that
partners would know their interests in a partnership and be able to
allocate partnership taxable income accordingly. This Article
illustrates, however, that the concept is illusory and that it undermines
the tax allocation rules, crippling the effectiveness of partnership
taxation. Some partners therefore allocate partnership income to
reduce their overall tax liability and unfairly deplete government
revenue.
The Article attributes the concept’s allure and illusion to path
dependency and tax myopia—partnership tax experts expend
considerable effort mastering difficult rules, which they cling to, and
they focus narrowly on the tax aspects of those rules. The Article
introduces three correlatives to end the myopia and improve the tax
allocation rules: (1) economic items and tax items; (2) state law and
tax law; and (3) economic interests and partners’ interests in a
partnership. The Article illustrates that aspects of the current rules
are tax-centric (i.e., economic results follow tax allocations) and
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illusory. The rules’ tax-centricity may create unintended legal
consequences for unsuspecting partners; their illusion creates
opportunities for tax abuse. After illustrating the current rules’
shortcomings, the Article recommends fundamental reform of the
partnership tax allocation rules. It recommends a move to itemspecific economic-centric rules that will eliminate the unintended
legal and economic consequences of the current rules and curb tax
abuse.
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Tax partnerships are no longer the sole province of ma-and-pa shops
and other small businesses. Now, the largest multinational corporations,
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other businesses, and property owners use them for various reasons. 1 In
fact, tax partnerships hold one-fifth of the business assets and account
for one-third of total business entities in the United States. 2 That
presence is the result of unprecedented growth over the last several
years—growth that promises to continue based on recent trends. In fact,
tax partnerships are increasing in number, and their business activity is
growing in both absolute and relative terms. 3 For example, during the
eight-year period ending with 2007, the number of tax partnerships
increased 50%. 4 The value of assets held by tax partnerships increased
almost threefold to $20 trillion, the amount of tax partnership income
doubled to $4 trillion, and the amount of depreciation deductions taken
by tax partnerships increased significantly. 5
1. To illustrate the size of tax partnerships, in 2007, the largest 18,417 (of 3 million) tax
partnerships held more than $15 trillion in total assets and had $2 trillion of total income. On average,
each of those partnerships held $814 million of assets and had $109 million of total income. See
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ALL PARTNERSHIPS: TOTAL ASSETS, TRADE OR BUSINESS INCOME AND
DEDUCTIONS, PORTFOLIO INCOME, RENTAL INCOME, AND TOTAL NET INCOME BY SIZE OF TOTAL
ASSETS, 2007 tbl. 15 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/
0,,id=130919,00.html (follow “2007” hyperlink under “All Partnerships” heading). See also infra text
accompanying notes 211–218 (illustrating the use of tax partnerships by a smaller property owner and a
multinational corporation).
2. See infra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
3. Commentators note with fascination the proliferation of unincorporated entities (most of
which are likely tax partnerships) over the last several years. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, Bonding Limited
Liability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1417, 1445–46 (2010) (illustrating that the number of limited
liability company filings in three major states for the five-year period ended in 2008 increased by 10.6%,
while the number of corporate filings decreased by 1.2% during the same period and suggesting states
should require such entities to post bond to do business in the states); Larry E. Ribstein, Uncorporating
the Large Firm 34 (Ill. L. & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. LE08-016, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abst ract_id=1003790 (examining the use of unincorporated
entities as vehicles for equity funds and large publicly traded ventures). The amount of assets
partnerships hold and the income and deductions they account for also speak to the role partnerships
now play in the economy. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ALL PARTNERSHIPS: TOTAL ASSETS, TRADE
OR BUSINESS INCOME, RENTAL INCOME, AND TOTAL NET INCOME, BY SELECTED INDUSTRIAL GROUP,
2007 tbl. 1 (2007) [hereinafter THE 2007 PARTNERSHIP STATISTICS], available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/ article/0,,id=201174,00.html (follow “2007” hyperlink). Based on 2007
estimates, partnerships hold $20 trillion of assets, have $4.2 trillion of income, and receive $3.9 trillion
of deductions. Id.
4. In 2000, the IRS reported 2 million tax partnerships. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ALL
PARTNERSHIPS: TOTAL ASSETS, TRADE OR BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS, PORTFOLIO INCOME,
RENTAL INCOME, AND TOTAL NET INCOME FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIAL GROUPS, 2000 tbl. 1 (2000)
[hereinafter THE 2000 PARTNERSHIP STATISTICS], available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/
0,,id=201174,00.html (follow “2000” hyperlink). In 2007, the IRS reported approximately 3 million tax
partnerships. See THE 2007 PARTNERSHIP STATISTICS, supra note 3. The Article uses this time period
because its recent and relevant data are easily accessible for the years under observation.
5. Tax partnerships held approximately $6.7 trillion of assets in 2000, see THE 2000
PARTNERSHIP STATISTICS, supra note 4, and $20 trillion in 2007, see THE 2007 PARTNERSHIP
STATISTICS, supra note 3. Tax partnership income was approximately $2.2 trillion in 2000, see THE
2000 PARTNERSHIP STATISTICS, supra note 4, and $4.2 trillion in 2007, see THE 2007 PARTNERSHIP
STATISTICS, supra note 3. Tax partnerships claimed approximately $59 billion of depreciation
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The relative growth of tax partnerships is staggering. The number of
tax partnerships as a percent of total business entities increased from
29% to 33% between 2000 and 2007. 6 The percent of business assets
held by tax partnerships increased from 13% to 20% during that same
time period. 7 Comparing tax partnership income to U.S. Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) reveals that partnership income grew
significantly faster than GDP. 8 These comparisons, as summarized in
Table 1, illustrate that tax partnerships are a significant part of the
economy; analysts and commentators can no longer neglect their
presence.

deductions in 2000, see THE 2000 PARTNERSHIP STATISTICS, supra note 4, and approximately $86
billion in 2007, see THE 2007 PARTNERSHIP STATISTICS, supra note 3.
6. In 2000, the IRS reported approximately 5 million tax corporations and 2 million tax
partnerships. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NUMBER OF BUSINESSES, BUSINESS RECEIPTS, NET
INCOME, AND DEFICIT, BY FORM OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, TAX YEAR 2000 tbl. 3 (2000)
[hereinafter THE 2000 GENERAL BUSINESS STATISTICS] available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/
bustaxstats/article/0,,id=152029,00.html (follow “2000” hyperlink). In 2007, the IRS reported
approximately 5.9 million tax corporations and approximately 3 million tax partnerships. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., NUMBER OF BUSINESSES, BUSINESS RECEIPTS, NET INCOME, AND DEFICIT, BY FORM
OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, TAX YEAR 2007 tbl. 3 (2007) [hereinafter THE 2007 GENERAL BUSINESS
STATISTICS], available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=152029,00.html (follow
“2007” hyperlink). The number of business entities does not include sole proprietors.
7. Tax corporations held approximately $81 trillion of assets in 2007. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., 2007 CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK OF STATISTICS OF INCOME: U.S. TOTAL: RETURNS WITH AND
WITHOUT NET INCOME (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=165716,00.html.
Tax corporations held approximately $47 trillion of assets in 2000. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
2000 CORPORATION SOURCE BOOK OF STATISTICS OF INCOME: U.S. TOTAL: RETURNS WITH AND
WITHOUT NET INCOME (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/
0,,id=178035,00.html.
8. In 2000, U.S. GDP was approximately $10.3 trillion (compared to $2 trillion of tax
partnership income) and approximately $14 trillion (compared to $4 trillion of tax partnership income)
in 2007. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, National Economic Accounts: National Income and Produce
Accounts Table: Table 1.1.5, Gross Domestic Product, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/
SelectTable.asp (follow “Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product (A) (Q)” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 5,
2011).
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Table 1
Recent Growth of Tax Partnerships
Absolute Growth of Tax Partnerships
Metric
2000
Number of Tax Partnerships
2 Mill.
Assets held by Tax Partnerships
$7 Trill.
Tax Partnership Income
$2 Trill.
Tax Partnership Depreciation Deductions
$59 Bill.
Relative Growth of Tax Partnerships
Tax Partnerships/Total Business Entities
29%
Tax Partnership Assets/Total Business Assets
13%
Tax Partnership Income: U.S. GDP
1:5

2007
3 Mill.
$20 Trill.
$4 Trill.
$86 Bill.
34%
20%
1:3.6

This information about the growth of tax partnerships and the
potential abuses identified in this Article signal a troubling trend.
Business and property owners often form tax partnerships to avoid the
corporate double tax. 9 Once in tax-partnership form, many owners will
take further steps to reduce their tax liabilities. The partnership tax
allocation rules appear to facilitate such efforts, and with trillions of
dollars at stake, tax-reduction schemes could further cripple the
government’s ability to raise tax revenue and tame the unwieldy deficit.
Tax-planning opportunities exist with tax partnerships because of
complex (and often ambiguous) partnership tax rules. Partnership tax
rules generally apply to all non-corporate multiple party business
arrangements. 10 Thus, general partnerships, limited partnerships, and
limited liability companies are generally subject to partnership tax
rules. 11 Arrangements that are subject to partnership tax rules are tax
partnerships. The complexity of the partnership tax rules derives in part
from the nature of tax partnerships. Tax partnerships do not pay income
tax; instead, all partnership income flows through to the partners, and
they report it on their individual returns. 12 Each partner reports a share
of the income in accordance with the partnership tax allocation rules. 13
9. See I.R.C. § 11 (a) (2006) (imposing a tax on corporations); I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2006)
(including corporate dividends in gross income).
10. See I.R.C. §§ 701–777 (2006) (governing the taxation of partners and partnerships); Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2009) (defining tax corporation generally as an incorporated entity);
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006) (providing that business entities with more than two
members that are not tax corporations are tax partnerships).
11. Such arrangements may, however, elect to be taxed as corporations subject to corporate tax.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006).
12. See I.R.C. § 701 (2006).
13. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006).
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Tax partnerships are entities that own partnership property and
provide services in which partners have indirect interests. Partnership
property and services combine to generate taxable income. The partners
cannot trace partnership taxable income directly from its source to the
partner who contributed a particular resource. 14 For example, partners
cannot determine the extent to which a partnership’s rental income
derives respectively from partnership property and the partners’ efforts
to manage the property. Consequently, tax law cannot rely upon general
principles of income taxation to determine each partner’s share of
partnership taxable income. 15 Instead, partnership tax allocation rules
determine the partners’ shares of the income. 16
In fact, allocating partnership income to the partners is the
fundamental purpose and challenge of partnership taxation. 17 The
allocation rules rely heavily upon “partners’ interests in a partnership”—
a unique tax concept. 18 The allocation rules are, in turn, the heart of
partnership taxation. 19 Furthermore, the allocation rules can affect the
partners’ legal rights and obligations in the partnership.
Despite the central importance of the concept of partners’ interests in
a partnership, commentators and politicians have largely neglected to
critically examine it. 20 This Article is the first to claim that partners’
14. See Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 GA. L. REV. 717,
752–61 (2009) (discussing the use of allocations to reduce agency costs in tax partnerships and the
resultant difficulties such allocations present).
15. See Bradley T. Borden, Taxing Shared Economies of Scale, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 721, 736
(2009) (“General principles of income tax become inadequate when parties integrate resources.”).
16. See I.R.C. § 704 (2006) (governing the allocation of partnership taxable income).
17. See Gregg D. Polsky, Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations 1–2 (FSU Coll. of Law,
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 436, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571542 (“How to allocate a partnership’s tax items is the most fundamental
issue in” partnership taxation.); Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered Ceilings,
and the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2009) (claiming that the
partnership tax allocation rules are “absolutely fundamental to the theory and practice of” partnership
taxation.).
18. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (2006).
19. This Article follows the convention in the regulations and uses the terms “partners’ interests
in the partnership,” “partner’s interest in the partnership,” “partner’s interest in a partnership,” and
similar terms interchangeably as appropriate to refer to the concept. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (as
amended in 2008).
20. At least two articles have considered the technical aspects of the concept. See Bradley T.
Borden, Allocations Made in Accordance with Partners’ Interests in the Partnership, 11 BUS. ENT. 4
(2009) (focusing on the technical shortcomings of the factors used to determine partners’ interests in a
partnership); Stephen Utz, Allocation and Reallocation in Accordance with the Partners’ Interests in the
Partnership, 56 TAX LAW. 357 (2002) (observing two possible approaches for allocating items in
accordance with partners’ interests in a partnership). Other articles focus on allocation rules, but they
neglect the importance and deficiencies of the concept of partners’ interests in a partnership. See, e.g.,
Walter D. Schwidetzky, The Partnership Allocation Rules of Section 704(b): To Be or Not to Be, 17 VA.
TAX REV. 707, 717 (1998) (describing the allocation rules and observing that they should not be
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interest in a partnership is illusory in the tax context and its use seriously
flaws partnership taxation. This Article demonstrates that the flaws
bleed over into legal and economic aspects of tax partnerships. This
Article claims that because of the central role of partners’ interests in a
partnership, its illusory nature undermines partnership taxation, and
nothing short of a fundamental reform will remedy the deficiency.
Commentators and politicians’ neglect appears to derive from two
phenomena. The first is path dependency; partnership tax experts
expend considerable time and energy mastering the complicated
partnership tax allocation rules, and they embrace that which they
master. The second is tax myopia; partnership tax experts often focus
narrowly on tax law and neglect the broader context in which tax issues
arise.
This Article introduces three correlatives to place the rules in a
broader context, to break down tax myopia, to help frame the issues, and
to lead to better rules. It suggests that the allocation rules must account
for the correlation between: (1) economic items and tax items; (2) state
law and tax law; and (3) partners’ economic interests and partners’
interests in the partnership. The three correlatives, as depicted in Table
2, are crucial to analyzing partners’ interests in a partnership, and the
analysis this Article models illustrates how the correlatives will facilitate
analyses of other aspects of partnership taxation.
Table 2
Partnership Correlatives
Economic Items
State Law
Economic Interests

Tax Items
Tax Law
Partners’ Interests

Part I of this Article explores the first correlative. That Part illustrates
the responsibility the law has to govern the allocation of tax items and
how taxpayers may take advantage of deficient allocation rules to reduce
the amount of tax they would otherwise owe. Part II of this Article
discusses the second correlative—the distinction between state law
allocation rules and the partnership tax allocation rules. That Part
illustrates that the two bodies of law are intertwined and that taxpayers
reformed); Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 TAX L. REV. 545, 613 (1986) (discussing the
allocation rules generally but noting specifically that “partners’ interests are not as easily determined in
many cases”). Recent scholarship in this area calls for changes to other parts of the allocation rules.
See, e.g., Polsky, supra note 17 (recommending changes to the test for substantiality and the rules
governing allocation of built-in gains and losses, respectively); Monroe, supra note 17 (same).
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may unwittingly alter their intended legal and economic arrangement by
adopting the partnership tax allocation rules’ economic effect safe
harbor. That Part also demonstrates how the current allocation rules are
tax-centric because they cause economic items to follow the allocation
of tax items. Part III describes partners’ interests in a partnership as a
unique tax concept and distinguishes it from partners’ economic
interests. That Part also illustrates that the concept is illusory when used
in the tax context. Part IV proposes fundamental changes to the rules
that would eliminate the shortcomings in the current law and move to
item-specific economic-centric tax-item allocations.
I. CORRELATIVE ONE: ECONOMIC ITEMS AND TAX ITEMS
The analysis of partners’ interests in a partnership begins with the
distinction between economic items and tax items. An economic item is
a metric that expresses economic activity; a tax item is an amount
reported on a tax return. An example of an individual taxpayer
illustrates the difference between economic items and tax items.
Employees receive cash payment for services. The cash payment is
an economic item. It has a corresponding tax item—compensation
income. Tax law requires employees to report compensation income on
their tax returns. 21 Because the tax item corresponds to an economic
item, it is a corresponding tax item. 22 Employers often pay a portion of
their employees’ health insurance premiums as a part of their
compensation, and those payments are economic items. Tax law does
not require employees to report such payments as income on their tax
returns. 23 Therefore, employees often receive an economic item that has
no accompanying tax item.
Finally, an individual may own depreciable property. Tax law allows
the individual to claim a depreciation deduction regardless of
fluctuations in the property’s value. 24 Thus, the property owner will
generally have a tax item that does not correspond to an economic item.
Tax items that have no corresponding economic items are independent
tax items. Allocating corresponding and independent tax items to
individuals is fairly simple. An individual who provides services must

21. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2006).
22. See infra Part I (discussing the allocation of economic items and corresponding tax items).
23. See I.R.C. § 106 (2006).
24. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (2006) (allowing the deduction for depreciation); Simon v. Comm’r, 103
T.C. 247, 261 (1994), aff’d 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[S]ection 168 does not support [the] proposition
that a taxpayer may not depreciate a business asset . . . due to the fact that the asset may have
appreciated in value over time.”).
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report the tax items associated with those services, 25 and an individual
who owns property must report the tax items associated with the
property. 26
Allocating tax items in the partnership context can be difficult. A tax
partnership with $100,000 of rent receipts will also have $100,000 of
rental income, which is a corresponding tax item. Intuition suggests that
the partnership should allocate the corresponding tax item in the same
manner in which it allocates the economic item. Partners dissociate
economic items and tax items when they allocate them in different ratios
to the partners. The allocation rules should prevent the partners from
dissociating economic items and corresponding tax items.
A tax partnership with depreciable property will have a depreciation
deduction—an independent tax item. Because of the flow-through
nature of tax partnerships, the partnership must allocate independent tax
items to partners, even though the tax items do not correspond to
economic items. The allocation of independent tax items may not be
intuitive, but the allocation rules must address the allocation of such
items.
If the allocation rules do not prevent the dissociation of economic
items and corresponding tax items and adequately address the allocation
of independent tax items, partners will be able to use partnership tax
items to reduce their overall tax liability and commit other abuses. 27
This Article claims that the current partnership tax allocations rules fail
to adequately prevent partners from dissociating tax items from
corresponding economic items, and that the rules governing the
allocation of independent tax items are deficient. A more detailed
example illustrates why partners might try to dissociate corresponding
tax items and demonstrates how partners can use the allocation rules
abusively.
A. Economic and Tax Items of a Typical Tax Partnership
The following fact pattern is fairly typical, and it helps illustrate
concepts discussed throughout this Article. Sam and Claire form
Samaire Partnership on January 1, Year 1. Sam contributes $800,000,
and Claire contributes $200,000 to the partnership. The partnership
immediately uses the money to purchase an office building, which it
25. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114–15 (1930) (providing that a taxpayer may not assign the
obligation report income from services to another person).
26. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114, 119–20 (1940) (requiring the owner of property
to report income derived from the property).
27. See infra Part II.B (illustrating the potential for such abuse).
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rents out. The annual tax depreciation on the depreciable portion of the
office building is $20,000. Table 3 illustrates the partnership’s
economic performance over the first three years of the partnership’s
existence. 28 The partnership’s accumulated profit equals its cash
receipts minus its cash expenditures. The value of the property reflects
the changes in the property’s market value over the years. The residual
value reflects the amount that would be available for distribution at the
end of each year, assuming the partnership makes no distributions in
prior years.
Table 3
Performance of Hypothetical Partnership
Year

Accumulated
Profit

Formation
1
2
3

$100,000
$206,000
$310,000

Property Value
$1,000,000
$930,000
$999,000
$1,088,000

Residual
Value
$1,000,000
$1,030,000
$1,205,000
$1,397,000

The economic performance generates economic and tax items. The
partnership has two economic items: (1) operating profit, which is the
difference between rent receipts and rental expenses; and (2) changes in
the value of its property. In Year 1, the partnership has $100,000 of
operating profit and $70,000 of lost value. The tax items of Samaire
Partnership include tax income, depreciation deductions, and the gain or
loss the partnership would recognize upon the sale of the property. 29
The partnership must allocate the $100,000 of tax income and the

28. The table randomly assigns a value to the change in profit. It uses a lognormal distribution to
determine the property’s appreciation, based upon a separately assigned random change in value. The
performance is something that is very possible in an actual partnership.

Year

Profit

1
2
3

$100,000
$106,304
$103,575

%
Profit
Increase
6.30%
(2.73%)

Performance of Hypothetical Business
Accum’d Property
%
Property
Profits
Apprec.
Value
Value
Increase
$100,000 ($69,529)
(7.21%)
$1,000,000
$206,304
$68,930
7.15%
$930,471
$309,880
$88,170
8.45%
$999,401

Residual
Value

Book
Value

$1,030,471
$1,205,705
$1,397,451

$1,100,000
$1,206,304
$1,309,880

29. Tax items generally include all income, gain, loss, deductions, and credits. See I.R.C.
§ 702(b) (2006). This Article uses the nontechnical term “tax income” to refer to gross income minus
all tax deductions, other than the depreciation deductions.
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$20,000 of depreciation deduction to the partners in Year 1. The
partners will report those items on their individual tax returns based
upon the tax-item allocation rules. 30 Table 4 lists the economic items
and tax items for each of Samaire’s first three years.
Table 4
Economic and Tax Items
Year
1

Economic Items
$100,000 Profit
$70,000 Lost Value

2

$106,000 Profit
$69,000 Appreciation

3

$104,000 Profit
$88,000 Appreciation

Tax Items
$100,000 Income
$50,000 Unrealized Loss 31
$20,000 Depreciation
$106,000 Income
$39,000 Unrealized Gain 32
$20,000 Depreciation
$104,000 Income
$148,000 Unrealized Gain 33
$20,000 Depreciation

The allocation of economic items generally establishes the partners’
rights to the partnership’s residual value. If the partnership were to
liquidate at the end of Year 1, Sam and Claire would each have a claim
to a portion of the partnership’s $1,030,000 residual value. 34 Their
claims to the residual value generally would depend upon their
contributions and the allocations of the partnership’s economic items in
Year 1. 35 To illustrate, assume the partnership allocates the $100,000
profit and the $70,000 lost value equally to each partner, and then
liquidates at the end of Year 1. Each partner’s net share of the economic
items would be $15,000 ($50,000 of profit minus $35,000 of lost value).
Sam’s share of the residual value would therefore equal $815,000, and

30. See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702(a) (2006).
31. The unrealized loss equals the excess of the property’s adjusted tax basis at the end of Year 1
($980,000) over the property’s value ($930,000). The adjusted tax basis is the cost of the property
minus the depreciation deduction. See I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1012(a), 1016(a)(2) (2006).
32. The unrealized gain equals the excess of the property’s value ($999,000) over the property’s
adjusted tax basis ($960,000).
33. The unrealized gain equals the excess of the property’s value ($1,088,000) over its adjusted
tax basis ($940,000).
34. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
35. See Part II.A. Some partnerships determine the partners’ claims to residual value using a
distribution formula similar to those common in corporations. See Bradley T. Borden, Residual-Risk
Model for Classifying Business Arrangements, 37 FLA. ST. L. REV. 245, 276–78 (2010).
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Claire’s would equal $215,000. 36
Contrast the partnership’s economic items with its tax items. Samaire
Partnership’s tax income is the net of gross rental income minus rent
activity deductions. 37
Gross rental income and rent deductions
correspond respectively to the economic items of rent receipts and rent
expenses. Thus, they are corresponding tax items.
Tax law allows a depreciation deduction but that deduction does not
necessarily correspond to the economic performance of a depreciable
asset. 38
For example, Samaire Partnership has a $20,000 tax
depreciation deduction in each of its first three years of operation. 39
Those deductions do not correspond with changes in the property’s
value. 40 They also do not correspond to changes in the partnership’s
profit. 41 Thus, they are independent tax items.
Gain or loss is also a tax item. It represents the difference between
the property’s fair market value and its adjusted basis at the time of a
taxable disposition of the property. 42 The property’s adjusted basis
reflects depreciation deductions the partnership can take. 43 The
difference between the tax gain or loss and the property’s change in
value is the cumulative depreciation deductions. Thus, gain or loss is a
function of both a corresponding tax item (changes in the property’s
value) and an independent tax item (depreciation deduction). It is
therefore a hybrid tax item.
B. Economic Significance of Tax-Item Allocations
In the absence of tax allocation rules, partners would have significant
leeway to use tax-item allocations to their personal advantage, at the
expense of the tax system. Specifically, without effective rules, partners
could dissociate tax items from corresponding economic items and
freely allocate independent tax items.
Examples illustrate the
opportunities for abuse in a world with no tax-item allocation rules.
The potential economic benefit tax-item allocations provide may
attract attention from Sam and Claire. They must allocate the $100,000
36. Sam’s $815,000 equals his $800,000 contribution plus $15,000 of net economic items, and
Claire’s $215,000 equals her $200,000 contribution plus $15,000 of net economic items.
37. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(5), 162(a)(1) (2006).
38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
39. See supra p. 1087, Table 4.
40. In Year 1 the property’s value decreases by $70,000, and it increases in value by $70,000 and
$90,000 in Year 2 and Year 3, respectively. See id.
41. Profit fluctuates from $100,000 in Year 1, to $106,000 in Year 2, and to $104,000 in Year 3.
42. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
43. See I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1016(a)(2) (2006).
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of tax income and the $20,000 tax depreciation. 44 Assume the
partnership allocates the tax items equally to the partners. Sam will
report $50,000 of partnership tax income and $10,000 of partnership
depreciation deduction or a taxable income of $40,000. One economic
aspect of tax-item allocations is that they can affect the partners’
respective tax liabilities.
Recall that the partnership allocated $15,000 of net economic items to
Sam. That allocation provides him a before-tax economic benefit of
$15,000. His after-tax economic benefit depends upon the tax he will
owe on the allocated tax items. Assuming Sam is taxed at 20%, he
would owe $8,000 on the $40,000 of taxable income allocated to him. 45
Thus, the after-tax economic benefit of the partnership tax-item
allocation is $7,000 ($15,000 of net economic items minus $8,000 of
tax).
If tax law did not restrict the manner in which partners allocate tax
items, perhaps Sam would agree to report $60,000 of tax income instead
of $50,000. That would give Sam a net tax income from the partnership
of $50,000 instead of $40,000. 46 Thus, he would owe $10,000 of taxes
($50,000 times his 20% tax rate) instead of $8,000 on his share of
partnership tax items. Because the economic-item allocations do not
change, his after-tax economic benefit would be $5,000 instead of
$7,000. 47 This example illustrates that tax-item allocations may affect
partners’ economic situations. It is also an example of partners
dissociating a tax item from a corresponding economic item, i.e., the
partners allocated tax income in a different manner than they allocated
operating profit.
Partners may seek to dissociate tax and economic items for two
reasons. First, the dissociation may reduce the partners’ aggregate tax
liability without altering other legal and economic aspects of the
partnership. For example, assume Claire pays tax at 30%. If Sam
reports $10,000 more of the partnership tax income, Claire would report
$10,000 less. As a consequence, Claire would pay $3,000 less in
taxes. 48 The amount of tax Sam paid would increase by only $2,000, so
44. Tax law does not permit the allocation of unrealized loss, so the partners will not allocate that
item in Year 1. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006) (requiring a sale or other disposition to trigger gain or loss
recognition).
45. See I.R.C. § 1(a)–(d) (2006) (imposing a tax on individuals equal to their taxable income
multiplied by a tax rate).
46. The new net tax income derives from the allocation of $60,000 tax income and $10,000 of
depreciation deduction the partners allocate to Sam.
47. Sam’s after-tax economic benefit is the $15,000 of net partnership economic items allocated
to him, minus the $10,000 tax he owes on net partnership tax items allocated to him.
48. Claire’s reduction in tax owed would equal her 30% tax rate multiplied by the $10,000

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
H-BORDEN

1090

8/3/2011 10:52:19 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

changing the allocation decreases Sam and Claire’s aggregate tax
liability by $1,000.
Second, by agreeing to report more tax income Sam in effect agrees
to satisfy a $3,000 liability to the government on Claire’s behalf. 49 That
$3,000 liability relief would ordinarily be gross income to Claire, 50 but
Sam probably would not make the payment unless he received property
or services in return from Claire. 51 Claire would therefore probably
transfer something to Sam in exchange for the allocation, and the taxitem allocation would become consideration for that transfer. 52 Tax law
does not appear to require Sam and Claire to include in their gross
incomes the benefits they receive from the tax-item allocation. 53 Thus,
absent tax-item allocation rules that prohibit tax-item dissociation,
partners could keep from the government the tax owed on the tax-item
transaction.
Allocations of independent tax items also affect after-tax economic
consequences and provide similar opportunities for abuse. If an
individual takes a deduction for depreciation, the amount reduces the
individual’s taxable income. 54 That reduction provides an economic
benefit to the individual equal to the amount by which the deduction
reduces the individual’s tax liability. The reduction generally equals the
amount of the deduction multiplied by the individual’s tax rate. Thus, a
$20,000 depreciation deduction for an individual with a 20% tax rate
will provide a $4,000 economic benefit to the individual.
As an independent tax item, the depreciation deduction only affects
the individual’s tax liability. Consequently, the economic benefit of
depreciation is the amount of tax it owes the person claiming the
deduction. Nonetheless, when an individual disposes of depreciable
property, tax law requires the individual to recapture that depreciation
deduction as ordinary income or a § 1250 gain. 55 Depreciation
recapture therefore affects the character of gain the individual
decrease in the amount of partnership tax income she reports.
49. The allocation that reduces Claire’s tax liability is economically equivalent to Sam paying
Claire $3,000 and Claire using those proceeds to pay her tax liability. See Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (recognizing that the payment of tax on behalf of another is
equivalent to receipt of cash by the person for whom the tax is paid).
50. See id. at 731.
51. Even if Claire owed no tax on the extra income allocated to her, she might ask for something
in return for helping Sam improve his economic situation.
52. See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of Tax-Item
Allocations, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 338–40 (2008) (describing a partnership tax-item transaction).
53. See id.
54. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (2006) (defining taxable income as gross income minus deductions); see
also I.R.C. § 167(a) (2006) (allowing a deduction for depreciation).
55. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(D), 1245(a) (2006).
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recognizes on the disposition of the property and the tax rate applicable
to that gain. 56 The upshot of this system is that an individual may take a
depreciation deduction, but also must recapture those deductions at
ordinary rates on the disposition of the property. The lack of adequate
tax-item allocation rules would allow partners to allocate depreciation
and recapture differently.
Consider Samaire Partnership’s depreciation deduction. Assume that
over the first three years, the partners allocate the partnership’s
depreciation deduction equally to the partners (a total of $30,000 to
each). Sam’s (who has a 20% tax rate) tax benefit from the allocations
would be $6,000 and Claire’s (who has a 30% tax rate) would be
$9,000. 57 The depreciation would therefore reduce the partners’
aggregate tax liability by $15,000.
If tax law did not restrict the allocation of independent tax items, Sam
and Claire could use them to reduce their aggregate tax liability and to
facilitate tax-item transactions. For example, Sam could agree to
allocate all of the depreciation deduction to Claire. The allocation of an
additional $30,000 of depreciation deduction to Claire would provide
her with an additional $9,000 tax benefit, and Sam would lose the tax
benefit of the deduction. Because Claire is subject to a high tax rate, the
depreciation deduction would reduce the partners’ aggregate tax liability
by $18,000, instead of the $15,000 reduction that resulted from an equal
allocation. 58
The additional tax benefit would be similar to Claire’s receiving
$9,000 of cash from Sam. 59 Assume that Claire transfers a $9,000 piece
of property to Sam, and Sam could pay Claire $9,000 for the property.
That transaction would have tax consequences to Claire. 60 Instead of
paying $9,000 to Claire, Sam could simply agree to allocate all the
depreciation deduction to Claire. If the tax allocation rules do not
prohibit tax-item transactions, Sam and Claire could avoid taxes and
deplete tax revenue.
If the partnership later sold the property, absent adequate allocation

56. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006) (subjecting ordinary income, adjusted net capital gain, and
unrecaptured § 1250 gain to different tax rates).
57. Sam’s economic benefit will equal his 20% tax rate multiplied by his $30,000 share of the
$60,000 of depreciation deduction. Claire’s economic benefit will equal her 30% tax rate multiplied by
her $30,000 share of the depreciation deduction.
58. With all $60,000 of the depreciation allocated to Claire, the benefit would equal her 30% tax
rate multiplied by the $60,000 of depreciation deduction.
59. This is the same result that obtains if the partners allocate corresponding tax items as
consideration. See supra text accompanying notes 49–52.
60. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2006) (including gains from sale in gross income); see also I.R.C.
§ 1001(a) (2006) (defining gain and loss from the sale or disposition of property).
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rules, the partners could allocate the gain, including any depreciation
recapture, in any manner they choose. They could allocate the
depreciation recapture to Sam, who is subject to a lower tax rate. They
could allocate a significant portion of the remaining gain, which could
be subject to favorable capital gain rates, to Claire, who is subject to a
higher tax rate. Thus, without any rules prohibiting abuse, the parties
could allocate corresponding tax items, independent tax items, and
hybrid tax items to reduce their aggregate tax liability or enter into taxitem transactions.
To stop abusive tax-item allocations, the allocation rules must prevent
partners from dissociating tax items from corresponding economic
items. The rules also must govern the allocation of independent tax
items and appropriately address hybrid tax items. To recognize that the
current allocation rules fail all respects, one must understand how state
law and tax law affect partnership allocations of economic items and tax
items.
II. CORRELATIVE TWO: STATE LAW AND TAX LAW
Both state law and tax law adopt partnership allocation rules. State
law governs the allocation of economic items; tax law governs the
allocation of tax items. The two bodies of law often overlap, however,
and each may affect the allocation of both tax and economic items.
Despite the importance and confluence of the respective bodies of law,
they do not complement each other well.
A. Allocating Economic Items Under State Law
State law allows partners to agree upon the manner in which they will
allocate the entity’s economic items. 61 The variations of partnerdirected allocations of economic items are unlimited. Generally,
partners will specifically agree to allocate economic items in a certain
manner. For example, Sam and Claire might allocate economic items to
help reduce agency costs. 62 To help motivate Claire to provide excellent
management services, Sam might agree to allocate 55% of the operating
profit to Claire. Sam and Claire may also believe that superior
61. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001); UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT
§ 110(a) (2001), 6A U.L.A. 378 (2008); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 110(a) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 442
(2008).
62. See Borden, supra note 14, at 752–61 (illustrating possible uses of partnership economicitem allocations to reduce agency costs); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 786 (1972) (observing that members of
partnerships may use profit-sharing to self-police and help reduce shirking).
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maintenance will affect the long-term value of the property. Claire
might therefore agree to allocate 65% of the property’s change in value
to Sam. Those allocations should motivate the parties to provide their
respective services with greater diligence. Thus, the allocation of
partnership economic items fills an important role in many partnerships.
Despite the important role partner-directed items may play, some
partners neglect to use them. The reasons for neglecting to include such
provisions in a partnership agreement are undoubtedly numerous, but
some are recurring. 63 Perhaps the partners lack the sophistication
required to include such provisions, 64 or they may worry about the
perception of suggesting such an agreement. 65 Some partners may not
realize they are forming a partnership when they enter into an agreement
and consequently do not consider economic-item allocations. 66 Or some
partners who realize they are forming a partnership may believe the state
default allocation rules create the economic arrangement they seek. For
any such reason, partnership agreements may not include economic-item
allocations. In the event partners do not allocate economic items, state
default rules allocate them.
The state default allocation rules vary depending on the type of legal
entity the partners use. The default allocation rules determine the
partners’ distribution rights and obligations, so they also determine the
partners’ rights to the partnerships’ residual value. Thus, the default
rules are important. Although state default allocation rules may vary
from state to state, this Article uses the rules in the Uniform Acts, which
many states have adopted, to illustrate possible default allocations. The
discussion begins with rules governing the general partnership, and then
considers the rules governing limited partnerships and limited liability
companies, respectively.
General Partnerships. In the absence of allocation provisions in a
general partnership agreement, state law deems general partners to have
63. See Dennis S. Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 455, 477 (1995) (observing that many small businesses will not incur the cost to negotiate and draft
a carefully worded agreement).
64. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (2001) (suggesting that failure to
contract in close business arrangements may be a symptom of the parties’ “ignorance, lack of
imagination, or poor legal advice”).
65. See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting: The
Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1348 (stating that members of close business
arrangements may not formalize agreements because they choose to rely upon mutual trustworthiness
and fear undermining fragile trust that exists at the beginning of a venture).
66. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 201(a) (2007 & Supp. 1 2010).
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accounts. State law credits (i.e., increases) the partners’ accounts by the
amount a partner contributes and the partners’ shares of partnership
profits. 67 It charges (i.e., decreases) partner accounts for distributions
and the partners’ shares of partnership losses. 68 State default rules also
provide that partnerships divide partnership profits and losses equally
among the partners. 69 Upon liquidation, the partnership distributes
assets to the partners in accordance with their accounts. 70
State law does not precisely define profits and losses. The lack of a
clear definition can be a source of confusion. 71 For the sake of analysis,
this discussion assumes that for state law purposes profits and losses are
the difference between revenue and expenditures, including any changes
in the property’s value. This Article refers to this definition as state law
profit. Thus, the analysis assumes that state law profit is broader than
operating profit.
If the partners allocate economic items equally, at the end of Year 1,
Sam’s account balance would be $815,000 and Claire’s would be
$215,000. 72 Notice that the sum of the partners’ accounts ($1,030,000)
equals the partnership’s residual value at the end of Year 1. 73 The
balance of the partners’ accounts thus represents their right to the
partnership’s residual value.
Limited Partnerships. State default rules do not specifically allocate the
profits and losses of limited partnerships. 74 Instead, they assume that
“[n]early all limited partnerships will choose to allocate profits and
losses in order to comply with applicable tax, accounting and other
regulatory requirements. Those requirements, rather than [the limited
partnership act], are the proper source of guidance for that profit and
loss allocation.” 75
That assumption is misguided because tax,
accounting, and other regulatory requirements should not dictate the
allocation of economic items.

67. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001).
68. See id.
69. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001).
70. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2001) (requiring the
partnership to distribute the excess of credits over charges in partners’ accounts to the partners and
requiring partners to contribute the excess of charges over credits in the accounts).
71. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 66, § 2.07(b)(4); infra text accompanying notes 144–
148 (discussing possible different definitions of “profit”).
72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (illustrating the manner in which the partnership
would allocate economic items equally).
73. See supra p. 1086, Table 3 (presenting the partnership’s residual value).
74. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 503, cmt. (2001), 6A U.L.A. 444 (2008).
75. Id.
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First, tax concerns should not drive the allocation of economic items.
Tax should reflect the allocation of economic items. Second, tax
provisions dictate the allocation of economic items only if partners
include tax-item allocation provisions in the partnership agreement.
Third, accounting principles do not determine partners’ legal rights to
partnership property; they direct information reporting about an
arrangement’s economic performance. 76
Fourth, some limited
partnerships may fail to include tax and accounting allocations. If the
partnership agreement is silent, state law should allocate the economic
items. When it comes to the allocation of economic items, the law
should not defer to tax and accounting allocations.
Because state law does not expressly direct the allocation of economic
items in limited partnerships, default allocation rules must derive from
the state law distribution rules. State law provides that limited
partnerships shall make distributions based upon the value of
contributed property. 77 Mandating distributions based on contributions
appears to require limited partnerships to make distributions in
proportion to the value contributed by the partners. A limited
partnership may make liquidating distributions in proportion to the value
of contributed property only if it allocates the economic items in
proportion to the contributions.
An example illustrates how partners can derive economic-item
allocation rules from state limited partnership distribution rules. If
Samaire Partnership were to make a liquidating distribution at the end of
Year 1, state law would require it to distribute the assets based upon the
partners’ contributions. Sam contributed 80% of the total partner
contributions and Claire contributed the other 20%. Thus, the
partnership would distribute 80% of the partnership assets to Sam and
20% to Claire upon liquation. At the end of Year 1, Samaire
Partnership’s residual value is $1,030,000. If the partnership were to
liquidate at the end of Year 1, Sam’s 80% distribution would be
$824,000. That is $24,000 more than he contributed, so in effect, the
partnership must allocate $24,000 to Sam. The $24,000 is 80% of the
partnership’s $30,000 state law profit. 78 Claire’s 20% distribution
($206,000) would similarly require an effective allocation of 20% of the
76. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
NO. 1: OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ¶ 9 (1978) (“Financial
reporting is not an end in itself but is intended to provide information that is useful in making business
and economic decisions—for making reasoned choices among alternative uses of scarce resources in the
conduct of business and economic activities.”).
77. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 503 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 444 (2008).
78. The partnership had $100,000 of profits in Year 1 from operations, and the property
decreased in value $70,000. Thus, its state law profit was $30,000.
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partnership’s state law profit in Year 1. To ensure future distributions
will be in proportion to contributions, the partnership would make the
same proportionate allocations of its economic items in each of the
following years. 79
Limited Liability Companies. As with limited partnerships, state law
provides default rules for making distributions to the members of limited
liability companies, but it does not provide default allocation rules. 80
The rules provide that limited liability companies generally make pro
rata non-liquidating distributions. 81 Upon liquidation, limited liability
companies make distributions first to return contributions, 82 and then
distribute any remaining property to the members in equal shares. 83
These rules effectively allocate profit equally to the members of limited
liability companies. 84
An example illustrates the allocations. Assume Samaire Partnership
is a limited liability company and distributes $120,000 to the members at
the end of Year 1. The distribution would appear to consist of $30,000
of state law profits and $90,000 (the difference between the $120,000
distribution and $30,000 of state law profit) of contributed property.
Each partner’s distribution would consist in part of state law profit and
in part of partnership capital. Thus, the partnership would distribute
$15,000 of profits (half of the partnership’s $30,000 state law profits) to
each partner and would return to each partner $45,000 of their original
contributions. After the distributions, Sam’s remaining account would
be $755,000 and Claire’s would be $155,000.
Assume the limited liability company liquidates at the end of Year 2.
First, the partnership would distribute $755,000 to Sam and $155,000 to
Claire to return their undistributed contributions. 85 Second, the limited
liability company would distribute the remaining $225,000 equally to
Sam and Claire. Sam’s total liquidating distribution at the end of Year 2

79. This assumes no other contributions or distributions in a different proportion, which would
alter the partners’ distribution rights.
80. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 404, cmt. (2006), 6B U.L.A. 480–81 (2008).
81. See id. § 404(a).
82. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 708(b)(1) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 514 (2008).
83. See id. § 708(b)(2).
84. To simplify the analysis, this Article does not consider the consequences of an unprofitable
limited liability company. If a limited liability company liquidated following years of only losses
(during which it made no distributions), it would allocate those losses in proportion to contributions.
85. Recall that Sam had contributed $800,000 and the partnership distributed $45,000 to him at
the end of Year 1 as a return of his contribution. Claire had contributed $200,000 and the partnership
distributed $45,000 to her at the end of Year 1 as a return of her contribution. Thus, Sam’s and Claire’s
undistributed contributions at the end of Year 1 were $755,000 and $155,000, respectively.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss3/4

20

Borden: THE ALLURE AND ILLUSION OF PARTNERS’ INTERESTS IN A PARTNERSHIP
H-BORDEN

2011]

8/3/2011 10:52:19 AM

PARTNERS’ INTERESTS IN A PARTNERSHIP

1097

would equal $867,500, 86 and over the two-year period, Samaire’s total
distributions to Sam would equal $902,500. 87 As a result of the state
default rules, Sam would receive his original $800,000 contribution plus
one-half of the partnership’s $205,000 of state law profits. 88 Claire
would similarly receive her contribution plus one-half of the
partnership’s state law profits. Because the rules effectively divide the
profits equally among the partners, their rights to the partnership’s
residual value would appear to be the same as their rights under the
general-partnership default rules. 89
Tax Partnerships with Loss. The discussion to this point has focused on
partnerships with positive residual values. In each of the examples
above, the partners had rights to distributions. Some tax partnerships,
however, may not have positive residual values, or the allocation of
losses may cause some partners to have negative accounts. In such
situations, partners may incur obligations to make contributions to the
partnership. The distinction between general partnerships, limited
partnerships, and limited liability companies is critical when considering
partners’ obligations to make contributions to the partnership.
The state default rules impose joint and several liability on all
members of a general partnership. 90 Furthermore, if partnership losses
cause the partnership to have residual obligations, the partners will have
to make contributions to the partnership to satisfy those obligations. 91
Similarly, state default rules subject general partners of limited
partnerships to the obligations of a limited partnership. 92 Thus, a
general partner may have to make contributions to a limited partnership
to satisfy the partnership’s obligations.
By contrast, state default rules generally protect limited partners and
members of limited liability companies from the obligation to make
86. That amount equals the $755,000 return of his remaining contribution plus his $112,500
share of the $225,000 remaining after the distribution of contributed property.
87. Sam’s Year 1 distribution was $60,000 and his Year 2 distribution was $867,500, so his total
distribution was $902,500.
88. Year 1 profits were $100,000 and Year 2 Profits were $106,000, see supra p. 1087, Table 4,
and the property was worth $1,000 less at the end of Year 2 than it was when the partnership purchased
it on the date of formation, see supra p. 1086, Table 3. Thus, total state law profits for the first two
years would be $205,000.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 67–73. If the limited liability company sustained losses
sufficient to deplete both Sam’s and Claire’s contributions, the losses allocated after Claire’s
contribution had been depleted would be allocated solely to Sam. Thus, if the arrangement has
significant losses, the economic-item allocations probably would not be equal.
90. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(a) (amended 1997), 6B U.L.A. 117 (2001).
91. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2001).
92. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 57 (2008).
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additional contributions. 93 Nonetheless, limited partners and members
of limited liability companies can contract away the liability protection
state law affords them. 94 In fact, as the next section illustrates, some
limited partners and members of limited liability companies may
unwittingly contract away such protection through tax-item allocations.
That possibility derives from the structure of the partnership tax
allocation rules.
B. Allocating Tax Items Under Tax Law
The tax-item allocation rules generally grant partners significant
discretion in allocating the partnership’s tax items. 95 Nonetheless, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may challenge the validity of partnerdirected tax-item allocations. To avoid such challenges, taxpayers may
seek to come within tax law’s economic-effect safe harbor. Generally,
the IRS will not challenge allocations made pursuant to the economiceffect safe harbor, 96 but to come within the safe harbor, partner-directed
tax-item allocations must have “economic effect.” 97 “Economic effect”
is a term of art, providing that the benefit or burden of an economic item
must follow the allocation of the corresponding tax item. 98 Thus,
allocations made pursuant to the economic-effect safe harbor are taxcentric. The following discussion demonstrates that these tax-centric
allocations can be problematic.
To come within the economic-effect safe harbor, the partnership must
satisfy three requirements: (1) maintain capital accounts according to
rules in the regulations; (2) liquidate in accordance with positive capital
account balances; and (3) require partners to restore deficit capital
account balances on liquidation. 99 These three requirements of the
economic-effect safe harbor supplant the state default rules, dictate the
allocation of economic items, and determine the partners’ distribution
93. See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (2001); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304 (2006), 6B U.L.A.
475 (2008).
94. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 110(a) (amended 1997), 6B U.L.A. 117 (2001); UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO.
ACT § 110(a) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 442 (2008).
95. See I.R.C. § 704(a) (2004).
96. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2008).
97. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (as amended in 2008).
98. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (as amended in 2008).
99. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) (requiring the partnership agreement to include provisions that
satisfy those requirements). An allocation can also have economic effect, if the partnership satisfies the
first two requirements of the safe harbor, has a limited deficit restoration obligation, and includes a
qualified income offset (this is the alternative test for economic effect). See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d).
Finally, an allocation has economic effect if the end result of the allocation is the same as the result
obtained under the safe harbor or alternative test. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(i).
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rights and contribution obligations. Thus, provisions that the partners
include in the partnership agreement for tax purposes affect the partners’
rights to the partnership’s residual value.
An example illustrates the legal significance of coming within the
economic-effect safe harbor and demonstrates how tax-item allocation
can create fictitious economic items. Assume Sam and Claire focus
solely on allocating tax items. They agree to allocate all tax items,
except the depreciation deduction, equally. They agree to allocate the
depreciation deduction 60% to Sam and 40% to Claire. They structure
their partnership agreement to come within the economic-effect safe
harbor.
The economic-effect safe harbor requires the partners to increase their
capital accounts by the amount of money contributed to the
partnership. 100 Consequently, Sam’s beginning capital account balance
will be $800,000 and Claire’s will be $200,000. Over the first three
years, Samaire Partnership allocates the $310,000 of tax income equally
to Sam and Claire. It allocates the $60,000 of depreciation deduction as
follows: $36,000 (60%) to Sam and $24,000 (40%) to Claire. The
capital account maintenance rules require the partnership to increase the
capital accounts by the amount of tax income allocated to the
partners. 101 The partnership must decrease the capital accounts by the
amount of tax loss or deduction allocated to the partners.102 The
partnership will therefore increase Sam’s and Claire’s capital accounts
each by $155,000—their shares of partnership tax income. The
partnership will decrease Sam’s capital account by $36,000 and Claire’s
by $24,000 for the allocated depreciation deduction. After those
adjustments, Sam’s capital account balance will be $919,000 and
Claire’s will be $331,000.
Recognize that although the depreciation deduction is an independent
tax item, the capital account maintenance rules require the partnership to
adjust the partners’ capital accounts to reflect the tax-item allocation. 103
To consider the effect of the rules, assume Samaire Partnership
liquidates at the end of Year 3 by selling its property and distributing all
of its cash. At the end of Year 3, Samaire Partnership would sell the
property for its $1,088,000 fair market value and recognize $148,000 of
taxable gain. 104 Pursuant to the partnership agreement, Samaire
100. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(1)(2).
101. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(3).
102. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(7).
103. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. (1) (reducing the partners’ capital accounts by the amount of
depreciation allocated to the partners).
104. At the end of Year 3, the property’s adjusted basis would be the original $1,000,000 basis

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

23

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
H-BORDEN

1100

8/3/2011 10:52:19 AM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Partnership would allocate that gain to Sam and Claire and adjust their
capital accounts accordingly. 105 Thus, Sam’s capital account would
become $993,000 and Claire’s would become $405,000.
The
partnership would distribute the $1,398,000 of cash to the partners in
those respective amounts, i.e., in accordance with their positive capital
account balances.
The distributions the partners would receive under the economiceffect safe harbor vary from the amounts the partnership would
distribute to the partners if the state default rules applied. If the state
default rules applied, the partnership would allocate profit and losses
equally to the partners. 106 Over the three years, the partnership has
$310,000 of operating profit, and the property appreciates $88,000.107
The partnership would therefore allocate $199,000 (one half of
$398,000) of the economic items to each of Sam and Claire. After those
allocations, Sam’s account would be $999,000 and Claire’s would be
$399,000. The allocation of the independent tax item pursuant to the
economic-effect safe harbor therefore shifted $6,000 of economic items
from Sam to Claire over three years.
If the partners are not aware that tax-item allocations affect their legal
rights and obligations, they may inadvertently alter their distribution
rights by making tax-item allocations. The partners may be even more
surprised if a tax-item allocation causes a partner to have a deficit capital
account balance, which obligates the partner to contribute additional
capital to the partnership. Such obligation could arise in particular if the
partners simply adopt boilerplate tax language to satisfy the economiceffect safe harbor.
The legal form of the tax partnership will be irrelevant in such
situations. The language in the partnership agreement that adopts the
economic-effect safe harbor will supplant state law, so limited partners
and members of limited liability companies could become obligated to
make additional capital contributions. Such obligations may shock
partners who thought the legal form of the arrangement shielded them
from obligations to make additional contributions. That potential to trap
the misinformed is a serious deficiency of the current rules.
reduced by the $60,000 of depreciation or $940,000. See I.R.C. § 1011(a) (2010). The difference
between the $1,088,000 received on the sale and the $940,000 adjusted basis produces the $148,000 of
gain recognized. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2010).
105. Sam and Claire could have agreed to allocate the depreciation recapture in the same
proportion in which they allocated the depreciation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (as amended in 2008).
If they had done so, the allocation would have not altered the economic interests they would have had
under state law.
106. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
107. See supra p. 1086, Table 3.
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The adoption of the economic-effect safe harbor may, however, have
unintended consequences for partners who understand that partnerdirected tax-item allocations can affect the allocation of economic items.
Those partners may inadvertently overlook some potentialities. The
inability to foresee all contingencies prohibits even the most
sophisticated partners from predicting the effect tax-item allocations
may have when made pursuant to the economic-effect safe harbor.
Tax-item allocations made pursuant to the economic-effect safe
harbor may cause problems that partners and tax advisors prefer to
avoid. Others may adopt the economic-effect safe harbor because it
provides certainty that the IRS generally will not challenge the
allocations. In either case, the partners’ interests in the partnership will
be important. For the group that avoids the economic-effect safe harbor,
tax-item allocations generally must be in accordance with partners’
interests in the partnership. 108 For the group that adopts the economiceffect safe harbor, the allocations must be substantial. 109 The test for
substantiality uses partners’ interests in a partnership.
The test for substantiality is designed to prevent tax-item allocations
that reduce the overall tax liability of the partners or improve the aftertax economic consequences of one partner without diminishing after-tax
situations of other partners. 110 The test requires a comparison of the
after-tax economic results of safe-harbor allocations to the after-tax
economic results of allocations made in accordance with the partners’
interests in the partnership. 111 If an allocation lacks substantiality, tax
law reallocates tax items in accordance with the partners’ interests in the
partnership. 112 This rule suggests that allocations made in accordance
with partners’ interests in the partnership should be different from
allocations made pursuant to the economic-effect safe harbor.
Using partners’ interests in a partnership as a baseline for the
substantiality test is problematic. An allocation that has economic
effects is part of the partnership agreement and establishes the partners’
108. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (2006). This assumes that the partners do not otherwise satisfy the test
for economic effect.
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2008).
110. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a). For example, an allocation of a depreciation deduction from
one partner, who has no taxable income outside the partnership, to the other partner, who has significant
taxable income outside the partnership, may benefit one partner but not diminish the economic situation
of the other partner. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 5. See also id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b) (prohibiting
shifting allocations that reduce the overall tax liability of the partners). See also Richard M. Leder, TaxDriven Partnership Allocations with Economic Effect: The Overall After-Tax Present Value Test for
Substantiality and other Considerations, 54 TAX LAW. 753 (2000) (critiquing the present-value test for
substantiality).
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in 2008).
112. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i).
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distribution rights and contribution obligations. The allocations supplant
state default rules. 113 If the partners’ interests in a partnership were a
valid concept, surely it would depend upon the partners’ distribution
rights and contribution obligations. 114 If so, safe-harbor allocations
would be identical to allocations made pursuant to the partners’ interests
in the partnership. That result would render a comparison futile. 115
Because that interpretation of the test produces an absurd result, the
test for substantiality appears to require the partners to consider
allocations that would occur if tax item allocations were not in the
partnership agreement. 116 The test for substantiality may require a
comparison of the consequences under the state default rules to the
consequences that result from partner-directed tax-item allocations.
That interpretation of the rule is also problematic. The state default
rules do not apply because the partners have supplanted them with the
capital account maintenance rules. 117 The default rules therefore
represent a partnership that does not exist. Using the state default rules
as a point of comparison therefore requires a deviation from reality.
Furthermore, as the following discussion demonstrates, partners will
have difficulty determining their interests in the partnership regardless
of the applicable allocation rules.

113. See supra text accompanying note 99–106.
114. Indeed, the definition of partners’ interests in a partnership relies upon the partners’
distribution rights and contribution obligations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i)(d) (as amended in
2008).
115. Despite the effect tax-item allocations have on partners’ rights and obligations, the
regulations provide an example of a partnership that allocates tax-exempt income to partners in a ratio
that differs from the ratio in which it allocates taxable income. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 5(i). The
example provides that the allocations lack substantiality because the partners expect to be in different
tax brackets and the allocations will benefit one partner without hurting the other. See id. The example
then requires the partners to reallocate the items in accordance with the partners’ interests in the
partnership, but the example does not appear to consider the legal consequences of the tax-item
allocation. This Article therefore rejects the example. In fact, the IRS recognized the problems of
relying on the partnership agreement to determine partners’ interests in a partnership for purposes of
applying the test for substantiality. See TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 118–19 (D.
Conn. 2004), rev’d, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]llowing a partner’s interest in a particular item of
the partnership to be determined by looking at the way the item is allocated by the agreement makes
the . . . rule meaningless.”).
116. This is the interpretation some commentators appear to accept. See, e.g., Polsky, supra note
17.
117. See supra note 61 (citing rules that recognize the primacy of tax-partnership agreements).
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III. CORRELATIVE THREE: ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND PARTNERS’
INTERESTS
The focus on partners’ interests in a partnership implicates the third
correlative—the correlation between partners’ economic interests and
partners’ interests in the partnership. “Partners’ economic interests” is a
general concept; “partners’ interests in a partnership” is a unique tax
concept. Neither concept is sufficient to govern the allocation of tax
items.
A. Partners’ Economic Interests in a Partnership
The partners’ rights to the residual value of the partnership represent
their economic interests in the partnership. Partners’ rights to the
residual value of the partnership equal their contributions to the
partnership adjusted by economic items allocated to them. 118 A quick
examination of partners’ economic interests in a partnership reveals that
it is not a viable metric for allocating tax items, but provides a point of
reference for examining partners’ interests in a partnership. Using
economic interests to allocate tax items is not viable for two reasons.
First, computing the partners’ economic interests requires perfect
information, such as the fluctuations in the value of the partnership’s
property. The examples above used perfect information created for the
hypothetical, but perfect information generally is unavailable or difficult
to obtain. Consequently, tax law often relies upon historical cost. For
example, the capital account maintenance rules rely upon historical cost,
allowing adjustments to the value of property only when certain events
occur. 119 The regulations also use the historical cost to reallocate certain
tax items in accordance with the partners’ interests in the partnership.120
The use of historical cost will often affect the determination of the
partners’ economic interests, so tax law should not rely upon it to
allocate tax items.
Recall from the examples above that after the first year of operating
as a state default general partnership, Sam and Claire would have
received $815,000 and $215,000, respectively, if the partnership had
liquidated. 121 Thus, at the end of the first year, Sam’s and Claire’s
economic interests in the partnership would have been 79% and 21%,
respectively. That example used the actual value of the partnership
118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra Part II.A.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f) (as amended in 2008).
See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(iii).
See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
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assets to determine the partners’ distribution rights. If the example
relied upon historical cost, the result would have been different. At the
end of Year 1, the historical cost of the partnership assets would have
been $1,100,000. 122 Sam’s share of that amount would have been
$850,000 or 77% of the total amount. 123 Claire’s share would have been
$250,000 or 23% of the total amount. The lack of perfect information
returns a result that does not reflect the partners’ economic interests in
the partnership. Allocating tax items based upon historical cost will
therefore dissociate tax items from economic items.
The difference that results from using historical cost can be
significant. For example, the amount of depreciation deduction
allocated to Sam at the end of Year 1 using perfect information would be
$15,800. 124 If the partners use the historical cost, the allocation to Sam
would be $15,400. 125 The allocation based on historical cost is roughly
2.5% less than the allocation based on market value. 126 If the historical
cost and market value diverge over time, the difference would increase.
Thus, the lack of perfect information could significantly affect tax-item
allocations.
Second, partners’ economic interests is a unitary concept reflecting
the partners’ distribution rights, which may consist of numerous
allocated economic items. Recall, for example, that to reduce agency
costs Sam and Claire may allocate the operating profits 55% to Sam and
45% to Claire, and they may allocate fluctuations in the property’s value
35% to Sam and 65% to Claire. 127 Tax law may apply different rates to
the tax items that correspond to those economic items. 128 If tax law
allocates all tax items according to unitary economic interests, the taxitem allocations could easily dissociate from the economic-item
allocations.
For example, based on the historical cost of the
partnership’s assets, Sam’s unitary economic interest could be 77%. If
the partnership allocates tax income to him in that percentage, it will
122. To simplify the illustration, this example disregards the depreciation deduction, which tax
law would normally take into account in determining the book value of partnership assets. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.704-3(b)(2), ex. 1(ii) (as amended in 2005), (illustrating the reduction in book value for
depreciation to illustrate allocations made with respect to property with built-in gain).
123. Sam’s share would be his $800,000 contribution plus his 50% share of the partnership’s
profit for Year 1. As a percentage of total book value, it would be 77% ($850,000/$1,100,000).
124. The allocation derives from multiplying the $20,000 depreciation deduction by Sam’s 79%
interest based on actual value.
125. That allocation derives from multiplying the $20,000 depreciation deduction by Sam’s 77%
interest based on historic cost.
126. The percentage difference is the $400 difference divided by $15,800.
127. See supra text accompanying note 62.
128. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006) (subjecting ordinary income and adjusted net capital gain to
different tax rates).
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dissociate the tax income allocation from the 55% operating-profit
allocation. That dissociation confirms that partners’ economic interests
are not good metrics for allocating tax items.
B. Partners’ Interests in a Partnership
Because partners’ economic interests in the partnership are not good
for allocating partnership tax items, tax law wisely avoided relying upon
them. Instead, tax law adopted “partners’ interests in a partnership,” a
unique tax concept. Unfortunately, the definition of partners’ interests
in a partnership is woefully lacking. 129 First, the law does not establish
whether partners’ interests in a partnership is a unitary or item-specific
concept. The concept would be unitary if one value dictated the
partners’ interests in the entire partnership and every economic item.
The concept is item-specific if it recognizes a partner’s varying interests
in the various economic items of the partnership. Second, the definition
consists in part of multiple factors which create more questions than
they answer. Ultimately, the examination of the concept reveals that the
shortcomings are the natural product of an illusory concept.
The regulations provide that the partners’ interests in a partnership
“signify the manner in which the partners have agreed to share the
economic benefit or burden (if any) corresponding to the income, gain,
loss, deduction, or credit (or item thereof) that is allocated.” 130 That
sentence appears to indicate that to determine the partners’ interest in the
partnership, the partners should look to specific economic items of the
partnership that correspond to tax items. The next sentence states that
the arrangement to share specific economic items may not correspond
with the overall economic arrangement of the partners. 131 Taken
together, those two sentences appear to imply that the term “partners’
interests in a partnership” is an item-specific concept.
The regulations use an example to illustrate that the sharing of
economic benefits and burdens may not correspond to the partners’
overall economic arrangement. The example provides that a partner
may have a 50% overall interest in the partnership but have a 90%
interest in a particular item. 132 That example contrasts unitary interests
129. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (as amended in 2008).
130. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i). The language of the provision appears to be tax-centric, i.e., it
appears to suggest that the economic benefit or burden follows the tax item that is allocated. Because
the question is the proper allocation of the tax item, the tax item should follow the corresponding
economic item. That concept would be more clearly expressed if the sentence finished, “credit (or item
thereof), that must be allocated.”
131. See id.
132. See id.
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and item-specific interests and appears to suggest partners’ interests in a
partnership is an item-specific concept. The example is, however, very
narrow and does not appear to definitively support item-specific
determinations generally. 133
Other provisions suggest the concept is unitary. For example, the
regulations provide that the determination “shall be made by taking into
account all of the facts and circumstances relating to the economic
arrangement of the partners.” 134 Finally, the regulations list four factors
that should help define the partners’ interests in a partnership: (1) the
partners’ relative contributions to the partnership; (2) the partners’
interests in the partnership’s economic profits and losses if the interests
are different from their interests in taxable income or loss; (3) the
partners’ interests in cash flow and other non-liquidating distributions;
and (4) the partners’ rights to distributions of capital upon liquidation. 135
This language appears to support a unitary concept of partners’ interests
in a partnership. Thus, the regulations have language that supports both
an item-specific and unitary concept of partners’ interests in a
partnership.
Deficiencies in the four factors exacerbate the ambiguity of the
concept of partners’ interests in a partnership. Treasury populated the
four factors with non-technical terminology, making them ambiguous.
The regulations fail to provide the relative weight of each factor. Thus,
if the factors were not ambiguous, they each could return a unique result,
and taxpayers would not know how to resolve those differences.
Finally, perhaps because of the non-technical language in the
regulations, the factors appear to overlap significantly. An examination
of each factor illuminates these shortcomings.
Factor One: Partners’ Relative Contributions. The first factor is the
partners’ relative contributions to the partnership. 136 Tax law uses the
term “contribution” in numerous contexts to mean a transfer by a partner
to a partnership. 137 For the sake of analysis, this Article assumes that
definition applies to the first factor. Tax law recognizes that partners
can contribute property including cash and services to a partnership. 138
Unfortunately, this factor does not specify whether it refers to

133. Based upon the parenthetical in that provision, the regulations appear to refer to a qualified
income offset as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d) (as amended in 2008).
134. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(i).
135. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(ii).
136. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3)(ii)(a).
137. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 721(a), 722, 724, 752(a) (2006).
138. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (as amended in 1996).
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contributions of both property and services. If it refers to contributions
of services, it provides no guidance respecting the method for valuing
the contributed services, an apparently impossible task.
Contributed services have at least three possible values: (1) the
market value, as expressed by the opportunity cost of the services; (2)
the extent to which the services contribute to the partnership’s success;
or (3) the amount allocated to a service-contributing partner. The
opportunity cost is the amount a partner could make providing the same
services to a third party. That amount may not, however, represent the
value of the services to the partnership. The division of capital and labor
may put the service provider in a weak bargaining position, preventing
the service provider from claiming compensation equal to the incomegenerating potential of the services.
The true value of the services may be the extent to which they benefit
the partnership. Determining the extent to which services benefit the
partnership is one of the difficulties tax partnerships present. 139 Many
resources contribute to a partnership’s success. In most situations, the
partners cannot determine the extent to which property and services
generate the partnership output. 140 For example, Sam and Claire can
never know with accuracy the relative effect their services and the
partnership property will have on the partnership’s output. Thus, they
cannot determine the extent to which the services benefit the
partnership. This inability makes valuing contributed services difficult.
The temptation may arise to use partner-directed economic-item
allocations to determine the value of contributed services. For example,
the partners may allocate partnership income to a service-contributing
partner in a ratio that varies from the ratio of the value of contributed
properties. The temptation may be to use the allocation to establish the
value of contributed services. That method of valuation would require a
baseline against which the partners could compare the partner-directed
economic-item allocations. In the case of a general partnership or
limited liability company, if the partners do not specially provide for
allocations, state law will allocate the economic items equally to the
partners. 141 If the parties moved away from an equal allocation, then the
services would appear to be worth the difference between the equal
139. See Campbell v. Comm’r, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the value of a
profits-only partnership interest received in exchange for services is too speculative to include in gross
income); see generally Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1283
(2009) (applying the economic theory of partnership taxation to profits-only interests received in
exchange for services and the difficulty of taxing such transactions).
140. See Borden, supra note 139, at 1209–1303.
141. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001); supra text
accompanying notes 80–89.
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allocation and the partner-directed allocation. That conclusion is,
however, problematic for two reasons.
First, the state default rules do not necessarily represent the allocation
formula the partners would have adopted in the absence of service
contributions. Perhaps the partners would have adopted an allocation
ratio that tracked the value of contributed property. If such a ratio would
have been something other than an equal allocation, the comparison
should be between that other ratio and the ratio of the partner-directed
allocation. Then again, the partners may have considered only the
allocation they adopted, so there may be no other allocation with which
to compare. Knowing whether the ratio would have been something
other than the partner-directed allocation may be impossible.
Second, an allocation for services may reflect more than the partners’
understanding of the value of the services. For example, the allocation
could represent an economic incentive provided by one partner to
another to improve the partnership’s overall performance and may not
reflect the value of the services or their effect on a partnership’s
performance. 142 The non-service-providing partner may allocate more
of specific economic items to the service-providing partner to motivate
the service-providing partner to exert extra effort. Extra effort by the
service-providing partner may increase the partnership’s overall
performance and consequently increase the total amount of economic
items allocated to the non-service-providing partner. 143
The first factor does not definitively provide that partner contributions
include contributions of services, and partners will have significant
difficulty determining the value of contributed services. That ambiguity
and difficulty will often prevent the partners from determining their
relative contributions with respect to services. For those reasons, the
first factor probably does not include contributed services.
Factor Two: Partners’ Interests in Economic Profits and Losses. The
second factor is the partners’ interests in the partnership’s economic
profits and losses, if the interests are different from their interests in the
partnership’s taxable income or loss. “Profit” is not a technical tax term,
so it does not have a clear tax definition. This Article has used the terms
“operating profit” and “state law profit” to facilitate analysis. There is
no indication that either of those definitions would apply to the second
factor. Perhaps the factor intends some other definition to apply.
The term “profit” can have various, broad definitions and lacks
142. See Borden, supra note 14, at 754–61.
143. See id. at 753–54 (describing the possible effect of allocations on the amount of total
partnership output).
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technical significance in other disciplines. 144 Accounting uses the term
sparingly in a general sense but does not give it technical significance or
define it specifically. 145 Economists also use the term, but they have
long debated the definition of profit and do not have an agreed upon
definition for it. 146 Finally, as discussed above, state law uses the term
to help establish the partners’ legal rights to partnership resources. 147
State law does not, however, provide a definition of profits as used in
that context. 148 Thus, there is no single place to turn for a definition of
economic profits and finding a definition of losses may be equally
difficult. The lack of clear definitions of profits and losses make the
second factor difficult to apply, and taxpayers as well as the IRS may
apply it inconsistently.
Factor Three: Partners’ Interests in Cash Flow and Non-Liquidating
Distributions. The third factor is the partners’ interests in cash flow and
other non-liquidating distributions. Once again, the regulations fail to
define the key terms: namely “cash flow and other non-liquidating
distribution.” The regulations present the terms in conjunctive form,
suggesting that cash flow may be distinct from non-liquidating
distributions. That interpretation could return different values for this
factor.
Apparently the reference to cash flow is to the partnership’s cash
flow, not the partners’. 149 The partnership’s cash flow would appear to
144. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
NO. 6: ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ¶ 16 n.9 (1985) [hereinafter ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS] (“Profit is used in this and the following paragraphs in a broad descriptive sense to refer
to an enterprise’s successful performance during a period. It is not intended to have a technical
accounting meaning or to imply resolution of classification and display matters that are beyond the
scope of this Statement, and no specific relation between profit and either comprehensive income or
earnings . . . is implied. Loss as in profit or loss (in contrast to gain or loss) is also used in a broad
descriptive sense to refer to negative profit or unsuccessful performance and is not intended to have a
technical accounting meaning.”); BELVERD E. NEEDLES, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 113 (4th ed. 1992)
(“Profit has many meanings. One definition is the increase in owners’ equity resulting from business
operations. However, even this definition can be interpreted differently by economists, lawyers,
business people, and the public. Because the word profit has more than one meaning, accountants prefer
to use the term net income, which has a precise definition from an accounting point of view.”); Bradley
T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 925, 972 (2006) (discussing
the accounting, balance sheet, and dictionary definitions of profit).
145. See ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 144.
146. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–38 (Dodo Press 2009)
(presenting various interpretations of profit).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.
148. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 71, § 2.07(b)(4).
149. The language in the regulations does not specifically provide that it refers to partnership cash
flow, but flows of cash and property between partners and the partnership generally take either the
contribution or distribution label. The regulations’ failure to refer to contributions or distributions
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include cash receipts and cash payments, a common definition of cash
flow. 150 If the partnership uses the cash method of accounting, its
operating profits would often be similar to its net operating cash flow.151
Therefore, in the example above, the partnership’s net operating cash
flow would probably equal $100,000 in Year 1.
If the partnership agreement is silent on the issue, state law should
establish the partners’ interests in the partnership’s cash flow. State law
provides generally that property acquired by the partnership is the
partnership’s property and not the property of partners individually, 152
so the partners will not have a direct interest in cash flow received by the
partnership. The partners’ interests in cash flow may include both their
direct and indirect interests; thus, the analysis should consider both.
The partners have direct interests in distributed cash flow and indirect
interests in undistributed cash flow. State law provides that partnerships
credit partners’ accounts with their shares of partnership profit. 153
Partners may not be able to immediately access amounts credited to their
accounts through distributions, 154 but they could sell their rights to the
amounts credited to their accounts by selling their economic interests in
the partnership. 155 Thus, they would appear to be able to access the
value of the partnership’s undistributed cash flow through the profits
credited to their accounts, giving them an indirect interest in such
amounts. Based on that analysis, this factor appears to overlap the
second factor.
Non-liquidating distributions would appear to include any distribution
to a partner other than a liquidating distribution. 156 State law does not
suggests the cash flow reference is at the partnership level.
150. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
NO. 5, RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
¶¶ 52–54 (1984) (describing the statement of cash flows as representing cash receipts and cash
payments).
151. See DAVID SPICELAND ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 7 (5th ed. 2009) (“Cash basis
accounting produces a measure called net operating cash flow. This measure is the difference between
cash receipts and cash disbursements during a reporting period from transactions related to providing
goods and services to customers.”). Items such as depreciation would, however, distinguish cash flow
from taxable income of a strict cash method taxpayer. See id. at 198 (showing adjustments to statements
of cash flows to account for the depreciation deduction).
152. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 203 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 96 (2001).
153. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(a)(1) (amended 1997) , 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001).
154. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 501 (amended 1997), cmt. 6 U.L.A. 155 (2001) (“[A] partner who
misappropriates partnership property is guilty of embezzlement . . . .”).
155. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 502 (amended 1997), 1 U.L.A. 156 (2001) (“The only transferable
interest of a partner in the partnership is the partner’s share of the profits and losses of the partnership
and the partner’s right to receive distributions.”).
156. The regulations do not define non-liquidating distributions, but they distinguish this factor
from the fourth factor (rights to distributions of capital upon liquidation). See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
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provide rules regarding non-liquidating distributions. 157 Consequently,
partners may withdraw property from the partnership only if the
partnership agreement allows withdrawals. 158 The partners’ interests in
non-liquidating distributions may therefore consist only of their shares
of non-liquidating distributions made during the year. Those interests
may not equal the partners’ interests in cash flow as determined by
allocations of profits. 159
This factor could, however, refer to the partners’ interests in nonliquidating distributions expressed in terms of partnership cash flow. If
that interpretation is correct, the partners would determine the value of
this factor by dividing the amount of their non-liquidating distribution
by the partnership’s total cash flow. That amount could be different
from the amount determined using either of the other two methods. 160
Factor Four: Partners’ Rights to Capital upon Liquidation. The fourth
factor is the partners’ rights to capital upon liquidation. The regulations
do not define partnership capital. Accountants use the term “capital” to
refer to the equity portion of a balance sheet. 161 Used in this manner,
capital includes both the partners’ contributions and the partnership’s
retained earnings. In fact, accounting may divide capital into two
categories: (1) paid-in-capital and (2) retained earnings. 162
Consequently, if an accounting definition of capital applies, the fourth
factor could refer to the non-debt portion on the right-hand side of the
partnership’s balance sheet, i.e., the partners’ equity. If that were the
case, partnership capital would include partner contributions,
undistributed partnership cash flow, and increases in the value of
partnership property. The broad interpretation appears to be consistent
with the state law liquidation rules. 163 If that is the case, the fourth
factor subsumes the other factors and adopts the partners’ economic
interests in the partnership. As shown above, partners’ economic
1(b)(3)(ii)(d) (as amended in 2008). Treasury therefore appears to limit non-liquidating distributions to
distributions made other than in liquidation of the partnership. Another distinguishing interpretation
would treat any distributions of cash flow as non-liquidating distributions. Unfortunately, the
regulations provide no further guidance about the use of the term in this context. Thus, this Article
assumes, for the sake of analysis, that “non-liquidating distributions” refers to distributions made other
than in liquidation of the partnership.
157. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 71, ¶ 6.02(b)(2); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807(b)
(amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2001) (governing liquidating distributions).
158. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 807(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 206 (2001).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 172–176 (illustrating this potential outcome).
160. See id.
161. See SPICELAND ET AL., supra note 151, at 946–50.
162. See id.
163. See supra Part II.A.
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interests are not a viable metric for allocating tax items. 164 Thus, the
fourth factor appears to be useless. The following discussion reveals the
futility of attempting to determine partners’ interests in a partnership
with accuracy. That inability appears to provide taxpayers significant
opportunities to dissociate tax items from corresponding economic items
and to broadly allocate independent tax items.
C. Partners’ Interests’ Inability to Guide Tax-Item Allocations
Partners can create partnerships with varying levels of sophistication.
Even with basic arrangements, determining the partners’ interests in the
partnership using the four factors may be impossible. Additionally, any
attempt to apply a universal concept of partners’ interest in a partnership
will often prove futile. The following examples illustrate the futility of
such attempts and demonstrate that the law’s shortcomings provide
partners with the opportunity to allocate tax items to reduce their overall
tax liability and enter into tax-item transactions.
1. Partnership with Minimalist Partnership Agreement
Assume Sam and Claire form a default general partnership, i.e., they
fail to agree how they will allocate their economic and tax items. 165 In
addition to contributing the cash indicated above, 166 Sam agrees that he
will maintain the partnership’s office building, and Claire agrees to
manage it. 167 They each withdraw a reasonable amount of money from
the partnership as needed, so Sam withdraws $25,000 and Claire
withdraws $30,000 in Year 1. Because the partnership agreement does
not allocate tax items, they turn to the four factors to allocate the tax
items in accordance with their interests in the partnership. Notice the
factors are not conclusive.
Factor One: Partners’ Relative Contributions. Sam and Claire must
decide what constitutes a contribution to determine the first factor. Sam
contributed $800,000, and Claire contributed $200,000. If that is all the
factor includes, Sam contributed 80% and Claire contributed 20% of the

164. See supra text accompanying notes 118–128.
165. Possible reasons for such failure could be numerous. See supra notes 63–66 and
accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying note 28.
167. Property maintenance refers to painting, infrastructural repairs, and capital improvements.
Property management refers to negotiating lease terms, handling tenant concerns, arranging garbage
disposal, and cleaning.
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total contributions. If the factor also includes services, the task of
determining relative contributions is more difficult. 168 For the sake of
analysis, assume the factor only requires them to consider their cash
contributions. The relative contributions thus would be 80% by Sam
and 20% by Claire.
Factor Two: Partners’ Interests in Economic Profits and Losses. The
partnership agreement does not allocate the partnership’s economic
items; therefore, state law will govern those allocations. 169 Under state
law “each partner is entitled to an equal share of the partnership profits
and is chargeable with a share of the partnership losses in proportion to
the partner’s share of the profits.” 170 Thus, the partners each appear to
have a 50% interest in the partnership’s economic profits and losses.
Factor Three: Partners’ Interests in Cash Flow and Non-Liquidating
Distributions. Sam and Claire’s partnership agreement does not appear
to be completely silent regarding the third factor. Sam and Claire allow
each other to withdraw funds from the partnership as needed. Assuming
the partnership did not agree to compensate the partners for their
services, the withdrawals would be partnership distributions. 171 The
partners must determine how those distributions affect their interests in
cash flow and non-liquidating distributions.
Consider three different alternatives discussed above for determining
the partners’ interests in cash flow and non-liquidating distributions. 172
First, the partners might determine their interests in partnership cash
flow by considering the portion of cash flow in which they have an
economic interest. The partners’ economic interests in cash flow should
equal the amount of operating profits allocated to them, 173 which would
be 50% for each partner. 174 Second, the partners could consider their
interests in non-liquidating distributions to be a percent of partnership’s
total annual distributions. In Year 1, Sam’s percent of total distributions
was 45% and Claire’s was 55%. 175 Third, the partners could consider
168. See supra text accompanying notes 138–143.
169. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
170. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT. § 401(b) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001). The same result
obtains for members of limited liability companies under state law. See supra text accompanying notes
80–89.
171. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(h) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 149–160.
173. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
174. See supra text accompanying note 170.
175. Sam received the following proportions of total non-liquidating distributions in each year:
Year 1 $25,000/$55,000 = 45%; Year 2 $33,000/$60,000 = 55%; and Year 3 $20,000/$52,000 = 38%.
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their interest in cash flow or non-liquidating distributions to be their
distributions for the year as a percent of total partnership cash flow for
the year. The partnership’s cash flow in Year 1 was $100,000. Sam’s
Year 1 distribution as a percent of the total partnership cash flow was
25% and Claire’s was 30%. 176 Each of the three possible methods
returns a different result, and none of the methods appears unreasonable,
so the partners cannot determine a single value for this factor.
Factor Four: Partners’ Rights to Capital upon Liquidation. To
accurately apply the fourth factor at any time other than liquidation, the
partners would need perfect information regarding the value of
partnership assets. 177 That information would often be unavailable.
Sam and Claire would likely have to rely upon the historical cost of the
partnership’s property to estimate their liquidation rights. At the end of
Year 1, based upon the historical cost, the partnership would have
$1,045,000 to distribute in liquidation. 178 The amount each partner
would be entitled to receive if the partnership were to liquidate at the
end of Year 1 would equal the partner’s contribution, plus the amount of
operating profit allocated to the partner, minus the partner’s Year 1
distribution. Sam would thus be entitled to $825,000 and Claire to
$220,000. Expressed as percentages, Sam has a 79% right and Claire
has 21% right to partnership capital at the end of Year 1. 179
Table 5 summarizes the findings for each of the four factors. The
table reveals that the four factors do not conclusively establish the
partners’ interests in the partnership. Based upon the four factors, Sam’s
interest appears to vary from 25% to 80% and Claire’s from 20% to
55%.

Claire received the following proportions of total non-liquidating distribution in each year: Year 1
$30,000/$55,000 = 55%; Year 2 $27,000/$60,000 = 45%; and Year 3 $32,000/$52,000 = 62%.
176. Sam and Claire, respectively, received the following proportions of total partnership cash
flow in Year 1: $25,000/$100,000 = 25% and $30,000/$100,000 = 30%.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 119–126.
178. The analysis does not consider tax depreciation deductions in determining historical cost
because depreciation deductions do not accurately express changes in property values.
179. Sam contributed $800,000, was allocated $50,000 of profits, and took a $25,000 distribution.
Claire contributed $200,000, was allocated $50,000, and took a $30,000 distribution.
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Table 5
Factors Summary:
Partnership with Minimalist Partnership Agreement
Factor
Relative Contributions
Interests in Profits and Losses
Interests in Cash Flow
Rights to Capital upon Liquidation

Sam
80%
50%
25–50%
79%

Claire
20%
50%
30–55%
21%

With this information, Sam and Claire must report the $100,000 of
partnership tax income and the $20,000 depreciation deduction. 180 With
no way to determine the relative weight of the factors or to resolve the
discrepancies among the factors, perhaps the partners could allocate tax
items in any ratio that comes within the ranges the factors return. If so,
Sam and Claire may decide to allocate the tax income 80% to Sam and
20% to Claire.
That tax-item allocation differs from the equal allocation of operating
profit, a corresponding economic item, which state law mandates, so the
allocation would dissociate a tax item from a corresponding economic
item. The tax-item allocation is similar to the partners’ relative
contributions, and it is an action (contributing property) the parties took.
The state default rule determines their interests in the operating profits.
The application of the default rule may be evidence that they did not
consider profit allocations, so they may argue that less emphasis should
be on that factor. They may argue that the law should focus on the
factor that reflects their actions. If that argument is successful, Sam and
Claire may have significant allocation flexibility.
If Sam and Claire have leeway in allocating the corresponding tax
item, they should have at least as much freedom in allocating the
depreciation deduction (an independent tax item). They might consider
allocating the depreciation deductions 45% to Sam and 55% to Claire.
With such apparent leeway they would likely consider the economic
consequences of tax-item allocations and begin negotiating for the
allocations of the respective items. Such negotiations would likely
reduce the partners’ aggregate tax liability and may result in untaxed
tax-item transactions. They would appear to have similar freedom with
other types of partnerships.

180. See I.R.C. § 702(a) (2006).
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2. Partnership with Uniform Economic-Item Allocations
Sam and Claire could decide to allocate economic items in a manner
that reflects their relative capital contributions. Therefore, they may
agree to allocate all economic items 80% to Sam and 20% to Claire to
reflect their understanding of their relative contributions. Their
agreement does not, however, allocate tax items, so the partners must
allocate the tax items in accordance with their interests in the
partnership, and they would likely use the four factors to determine
those interests.
Factor One: Partners’ Relative Contributions. The partners’ relative
contributions do not change with the change of facts in this scenario.
Factor Two: Partners’ Interests in Economic Profits and Losses. In this
scenario, Sam and Claire agree that the partnership will allocate 80% of
the profits and losses to Sam and 20% of them to Claire. Those
percentages should represent the partners’ respective interests in
economic profits and losses.
Factor Three: Partners’ Interests in Cash Flow and Non-Liquidating
Distributions. Assuming Sam and Claire withdraw the amounts
identified above, the new partnership agreement does not help them
determine their interests in cash flow and non-liquidating distributions.
Their legal rights to partnership property do, however, change. Sam
would have an 80% interest in the partnership’s economic profits and
losses and Claire would have a 20% interest. Their distributions as a
percentage of total distributions and partnership cash flow would not
change.
Factor Four: Partners’ Rights to Capital upon Liquidation. Because the
partnerships made disproportionate distributions during the year, the
partners’ rights to capital will not reflect their proportionate
contributions. Instead, Sam’s rights, based on the historical cost of
partnership property, will be 82% and Claire’s will be 18%. 181
Table 6 summarizes the four factors. The four factors are closer to
uniform under this scenario, but they are still not perfectly uniform. The
lack of uniformity would appear to provide some leeway to the partners
for allocating tax items in accordance with their interests in the
181. Sam’s share of $1,045,000 will be $855,000 (his $800,000 contribution, plus his $80,000
share of operating profits, minus the $25,000 distribution), Claire’s share will be $190,000 (her
$200,000 contribution, plus her $20,000 share of operating profits, minus the $30,000 distribution).
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partnership. They may, however, have more difficulty under this
scenario convincing a judge that their interests in the partnership were
not 80% and 20%, but the four factors do not definitively establish the
partners’ interests in the partnership. Thus, a window of opportunity for
abuse may remain open.
Table 6
Factors Summary:
Partnership with Uniform Allocations
Factor
Relative Contributions
Interests in Profits and Losses
Interests in Cash Flow
Rights to Capital upon Liquidation

Sam
80%
80%
25–80%
82%

Claire
20%
20%
20–55%
18%

3. Partnership with Specially-Allocated Economic Items
A more complicated partnership exacerbates the inability to determine
the partners’ interests in the partnership. Sam and Claire may use
economic-item allocations to influence each other’s behavior. 182 For
example, they may allocate 55% of the profit to Claire (with the balance
going to Sam) and 65% of the change in property value to Sam (with the
balance going to Claire). Assume the partners make the allocations of
those economic items a part of the partnership agreement, but they do
not provide for the allocation of tax items. The partners therefore must
allocate the tax items in accordance with the partners’ interests in the
partnership, and they turn to the four factors to do that.
Factor One: Partners’ Relative Contributions. The temptation may
arise to use economic-item allocations to value contributed services.
This scenario helps illustrate that valuing contributed services is
probably impossible. 183 First, the partners may have agreed to
allocations, even though they knew the specific allocations may not
reflect the value of services. For example, Sam may have been willing
to grant Claire a greater percentage of the operating profits to motivate
her to provide services that increase operating profits. Assume, for
instance, that the profit from the partnership would be $90,000 if Claire

182. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 139–143 (claiming that valuing contributed services is
probably impossible).
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shirked under an equal allocation of the profits. Sam’s equal share of
that profit would be $45,000. If the disproportionate sharing of profits
motivated Claire to work and increase profits to $110,000, Sam’s 45%
interest in the increased profits would be $49,500. Sam would therefore
be willing to accept a smaller percentage of the partnership’s total profit,
if the total dollar value allocated to him increased.
Second, the partners may consider using the change in operating
profits as the value of Sam’s services. If profits increased from $90,000
to $110,000 because of Claire’s services, the value of the services would
appear to be $20,000. Based upon the effect Claire’s services have on
partnership profits, they appear to be worth $20,000. One problem with
this analysis is that the partners cannot be certain what the partnership’s
profits would have been without the allocation. Therefore, they cannot
be certain that the services generated an additional $20,000 in profits.
Third, the partners could treat the value of Claire’s services as her
portion of the operating profits, which would be $60,500. The problem
with that analysis is that the profits derive only in part from Claire’s
services—Sam’s services and the property also contribute to the
partnership’s profits. 184 Perhaps the property would have generated a
portion of that profit even without Claire’s services. The parties cannot
determine the extent to which each of the partnership’s resources
contribute to the partnership’s profit, 185 so they probably cannot
accurately measure Claire’s contribution of services in dollardenominated units.
The partners will have similar troubles determining the value of
Claire’s services, so disproportionate allocations do not appear to help
determine the partners’ relative contributions to the partnership. The
value of the property contributions is certain in this example because
both parties contribute cash. The partners will likely have to rely upon
property contributions only to determine the amounts under the first
factor. Therefore, the use of partner-directed economic-item allocations
does not appear to improve the determination of the relative
contributions. Thus, based upon their case contributions, the amounts
they use for the first factor probably remain 80% and 20% respectively.
Factor Two: Partners’ Interests in Economic Profits and Losses. To
accurately apply the second factor to the altered facts, Sam and Claire
need an accurate definition of profits and losses. If profits and losses
only include operating profits, the analysis is fairly straight forward.

184. See Borden, supra note 139, at 1299–303.
185. See id.
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The parties have agreed that the partnership shall allocate 55% of the
operating profits to Claire and 45% to Sam. If the terms include changes
in the value of partnership property, Sam and Claire may not be able to
determine a value for this factor because they may not know the value of
the property. If they know that value, the result for this factor would
likely change because they allocate changes in value in a different ratio.
For the sake of analysis, assume profits and losses only refers to
operating profits and losses, and Sam’s share of partnership economic
profits is 55% and Claire’s is 45%.
Factor Three: Partners’ Interests in Cash Flow and Other NonLiquidating Distributions. Sam and Claire make the same withdrawals
in this scenario that they made in the earlier scenarios, but they allocate
operating profits differently. Perhaps their interests in cash flow are the
same as their allocations of operating profit—45% for Sam and 55% for
Claire. Their shares of distributions as a percent of total distributions
and their shares of distributions as a percent of cash flow should not
change.
Factor Four: Partners’ Rights to Capital upon Liquidation. As with the
other scenarios, the partners’ rights to capital on liquidation will equal
their contributions, plus the operating profit allocations, minus
distributions. Thus, based on historical cost, Sam would have a right to
78% of the capital, and Claire would have a right to 22%. 186 Table 7
summarizes the factor results for the partnership with specially-allocated
economic items. Again, the results are not definitive and provide a
range of possible answers.
Table 7
Factors Summary:
Partnership with Specially-Allocated Economic Items
Factor
Relative Contributions
Interests in Profits and Losses
Interests in Cash Flow
Rights to Capital upon Liquidation

Sam
80%
45%
25–80%
78%

Claire
20%
55%
20–55%
22%

186. Sam’s share of the $1,045,000 will be $820,000 (his $800,000 contribution, plus $45,000 of
allocated operating profit, minus $25,000 distribution) and Claire’s share will be $225,000 (her
$200,000 contribution, plus $55,000 of allocated operating profit, minus $30,000 distribution).
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In this scenario potential dissociation of operating profit and tax
income allocations is perhaps most troubling. Sam and Claire agreed to
specific allocations of operating profits. Intuition suggests that they
should report the tax items that correspond to those allocations in the
same ratio as the economic-item allocations. The regulations do not,
however, appear to bind Sam and Claire to their economic-item
allocations, even with respect to corresponding tax items. The possible
notion that partners’ interests is a unitary concept would also suggest
that dissociation is not only permitted, but could be required. Therefore,
they may be able to dissociate tax items from specially-allocated
economic items. Perhaps they can allocate tax items in any proportion
between 25% and 80% to Sam and between 20% and 55% to Claire.
4. Partnership with Allocated Tax Items
In this scenario, assume that Sam and Claire include tax-item
allocations in their partnership agreement. Assume that they agree to
allocate partnership tax income 45% to Sam and 55% to Claire. They
also agree to allocate the taxable gain or loss from the sale of the
property 65% to Sam and 35% to Claire. Finally, they agree to allocate
the tax depreciation 75% to Sam and 25% to Claire. If the partners do
not come within the economic-effect safe harbor, the tax-item
allocations will be valid if in accordance with the partners’ interests in
the partnership. State default rules will govern the allocation of
economic items, so their interests in the partnership should be the same
as the interests considered above for the minimalist partnership.
Because the tax-item allocations come within the ranges in Table 5, Sam
and Claire might successfully argue that the allocations are in
accordance with their interests in the partnership.
Assume alternatively that Sam and Claire adopt the economic-effect
safe harbor. Accordingly, they agree to maintain capital accounts, make
liquidating distributions in accordance with positive capital account
balances, and restore deficit capital account balances. 187 Because the
allocations satisfy the economic-effect safe harbor, they will be valid
unless they fail the test for substantiality. 188 To test the tax-item
allocations for substantiality, the parties will have to compare them to
allocations made in accordance with the partners’ interests in the
partnership. 189 This example illustrates the proposition stated above—
187. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b) (as amended in 2008); supra text accompanying note
99.
188. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(i).
189. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii).
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tax-item allocations made within the economic-effect safe harbor affect
the partners’ interests in the partnership, and applying the test for
substantiality is impossible. 190 Examining the four factors illustrates the
effect the allocations have on the partners’ rights and obligations.
Factor One: Partners’ Relative Contributions. Sam’s and Claire’s
relative contributions do not appear to change in this scenario.
Factor Two: Partners’ Interests in Economic Profits and Losses. The
legal consequences of the partners’ self-directed tax-item allocations
should determine the partners’ interests in the partnership’s economic
profits and losses. The allocation of depreciation deductions appears to
differentiate this scenario from the other scenarios. When the partners
comply with the economic-effect safe harbor, the allocation of tax
depreciation affects the partners’ rights and obligations in the
partnership. 191 Consequently, depreciation deductions most likely affect
the partners’ interests in economic profits and losses. Assuming the
analysis must use historical cost and depreciation reduces the historical
cost, depreciation would reduce the amount of operating profits
available for distribution. 192 Sam and Claire would both have a $40,000
interest in the $80,000 partnership profits left after accounting for the
depreciation deduction. 193 Thus, they each appear to have a 50%
interest in the profits.
Factor Three: Partners’ Interests in Cash Flow and Non-Liquidating
Distributions. Because the partnership comes within the economiceffect safe harbor, the tax-item allocations could affect the partners’
interests in cash flow and non-liquidating distributions. The partners’
interests in cash flow should be equal because cash flow and operating
profit are synonymous. 194 The partners’ distributions as a percent of
total distributions should remain the same, but their distributions as a
190. See supra Part II.B.
191. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(7) (as amended in 2008); supra text accompanying
notes 99–109.
192. The deemed value of the property at the end of Year 1 would be its historical cost reduced by
the depreciation deduction, so the analysis must assume the partnership would have no gain or loss from
the property to allocate, if the partnership sold it in a hypothetical liquidation. The depreciation
deduction would reduce their rights to partnership property, including profits. Thus, the partners would
have rights in their contributions and the profits, net of allocated depreciation.
193. Sam’s interest in profits would equal his $55,000 allocation of tax income minus his $15,000
allocation of depreciation. Claire’s interest would equal her $45,000 allocation of tax income minus her
$5,000 share of depreciation. The equal interests in the profits are random, based on the tax income and
depreciation for the year. The interests would likely fluctuate from year to year.
194. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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percent of cash flow should change to reflect the effect the depreciation
deduction appears to have on cash flow. Sam’s $20,000 distribution is
25% of the $80,000 of economic profits and Claire’s $35,000
distribution is 44%.
Factor Four: Partners’ Rights to Capital upon Liquidation. The
allocation of the depreciation deduction affects the balance of partners’
capital accounts and therefore affects their rights to capital upon
liquidation. 195 Based on historical values adjusted for depreciation
values, Sam would have a right to 79% and Claire would have a right to
21% of the capital at the end of Year 1. 196 Table 8 summarizes the
results for each factor.
Table 8
Factors Summary:
Partnership with Allocated Tax Items
Factor
Relative Contributions
Interests in Profits and Losses
Interests in Cash Flow
Rights to Capital upon Liquidation

Sam
80%
50%
25–50%
79%

Claire
20%
50%
44–55%
21%

All of the partnership’s tax-item allocations come within the range
that the factors establish, so the allocations appear to be in accordance
with the partners’ interests in the partnership. Thus, they probably
would not change to provide a point of comparison to apply the test for
substantiality. The IRS may be unable to reallocate the tax items in any
other manner which could better reflect the partners’ interests. Thus,
even if the allocations appear to increase Sam’s after-tax economic
position without diminishing Claire’s, the IRS may not be able to
successfully challenge the allocations using the substantiality test.
Perhaps more significantly, the tax-item allocations under the economiceffect safe harbor determine the partners’ legal rights and obligations.

195. See supra text accompanying notes 99–109.
196. Based on historical costs, Sam would receive $805,000 (his $800,000 contribution plus
$45,000 of allocated tax income, minus the $25,000 distribution, minus the $15,000 of the allocated
depreciation deduction) if the partnership liquidated at the end of Year 1, which would be 79% of the
$1,025,000 available for distribution. Claire would receive $220,000 (her $200,000 contribution, plus
$55,000 of allocated tax income, minus the $30,000 distribution, minus $5,000 of the allocated
depreciation deduction), which would be 21% of the $1,025,000 deemed available for distribution.
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5. Partnership with Target Allocations
The final scenario considers a partnership that adopts target
allocations. Target allocations have become popular in recent years. 197
They transform an arrangement into something that differs from
traditional partnerships. As the discussion thus far illustrates, the
partners’ rights to the residual value of a partnership depend upon the
partners’ contributions and economic-item allocations (as may be
dictated by tax-item allocations in some situations). Because the
partners’ rights to the residual value of the partnership depend upon
allocations, such arrangements have allocation-dependent residual
risk. 198
In contrast, target allocations create distribution-dependent residual
risk. 199 Instead of using allocations to determine partners’ rights in
partnership residual value, target allocations use a distribution formula
to establish rights in partnership residual value. 200 They then allocate
partnership tax items in accordance with distribution rights. 201 Earlier
work illustrates that partnership tax is not equipped to address the
difficulties that arise in structures with target allocations. 202 The
following discussion demonstrates the difficulty of determining the
interests of partners who adopt target allocations.
Target allocation provisions generally use a multi-tier distribution
structure to determine the partners’ rights to partnership residual value.
The partnership agreement then requires tax allocations to follow the
tiered distribution structure. 203 To illustrate, assume Sam and Claire
adopt a three-tier structure. Tier One requires the partnership to make
distributions of available cash to partners who contribute property in a
manner that provides the contributing partners an 8% return on their
contributions. If the partnership does not have sufficient funds to make
all of the distributions under Tier One, it will make distributions in
proportion to the distributions it would have made with sufficient funds.
Tier Two requires the partnership to distribute any funds remaining after
the Tier One distributions in proportion to contributed capital. Tier
Three requires the partnership to equally distribute any funds remaining
197. See, Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations—Idiot-Proofing or Drafting for
Idiots, 35 REAL EST. TAX’N 116, 116 (2008).
198. See Borden, supra note 35, at 273–75.
199. See id. at 275–78.
200. See Cuff, supra note 197, at 126–28.
201. See id. at 126.
202. See Borden, supra note 35, at 286–91.
203. See Terence Floyd Cuff, Working with Target Allocations—Drafting in Wonderland, 35
REAL EST. TAX’N 162, 163 (2008).
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following the Tier One and Tier Two distributions.
A partnership with target allocations may attempt to come within the
economic-effect safe harbor and adopt the capital account maintenance
rules. The partnership agreement may also require the partnership to
allocate tax items to capital accounts in a manner that reflects the
partners’ rights to distributions under the tiered structure. 204 On an
annual basis, ongoing partnerships will encounter significant difficulty
in attempting such allocations. The partners’ rights to distributions
depend upon the value of the partnership’s property which often will be
indeterminable. Without sufficient information about the value of the
partnership’s property, the partners may be unable to determine, with
accuracy, their distribution rights. Consequently, they will be unable to
accurately allocate tax items in accordance with their rights to
distributions under the tiered structure. Determining the partners’
interests in the partnership will also be difficult, and the four factors are
unhelpful.
Factor One: Partners’ Relative Contributions. Sam’s and Claire’s
relative contributions would not change if they adopted target
allocations.
Factor Two: Partners’ Interests in Economic Profits and Losses. The
partners will have difficulty determining their interests in partnership
economic profits and losses. Because of the multiple tier distribution
formula, the interests depend upon the portion of profits and losses the
partnership would distribute to the partners if it were to liquidate. The
amounts of those distributions depend upon the value of the
partnership’s assets. For example, if the partnership only had sufficient
funds to make Tier One distributions, the partners’ shares of profits
would equal their relative contributions. If the partnership had sufficient
funds to make all of the Tier One and Tier Two distributions, the
partners’ shares of the profit would be based in part on their relative
contributions and in part on the Tier Three allocations. The inclusion of
Tier Three allocations would change the partners’ interests. Because the
partners do not know the actual value of the partnership property, they
may have difficulty determining how much the partnership would
distribute in each tier.
The partners may attempt to determine their interests using the
property’s historical cost. Using that value, at the end of Year 1, the
partnership would have $1,000,000 of profit and $100,000 of operating

204. See id.; Cuff, supra note 197, at 126.
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cash flow to distribute. The distribution would occur as presented in
Table 9.
Table 9
Year 1 Distributions Pursuant to Target Allocations

Tier One (8% of contribution)
Tier Two (return of contribution)
Tier Three ($20,000 residual)
Total

Sam
$64,000
$800,000
$10,000
$874,000

Claire
$16,000
$200,000
$10,000
$226,000

Total
$80,000
$1,000,000
$20,000
$1,100,000

This table suggests that Sam would receive $74,000 more than he
contributed, and Claire would receive $26,000 more than she
contributed. The sum of those amounts equals the partnership’s
economic profits, so Sam appears to have a 74% interest and Claire a
26% interest in the partnership’s economic profits.
Factor Three: Partners’ Interests in Cash Flow and Non-Liquidating
Distributions. The partners’ interests in cash flow and non-liquidating
distributions will also depend upon the value of the partnership assets.
The partners’ interests in cash flow should equal the interests in
partnership profits. Similar to the other scenarios, their distributions as a
percent of the total distributions and as a percent of the cash flow should
remain the same.
Factor Four: Partners’ Rights to Capital upon Liquidation. The tiered
distributions establish the partners’ rights to capital upon liquidation.
Based on the analysis above, Sam would receive $874,000 and Claire
would receive $226,000 if the partnership liquidated, based upon
historical cost, at the end of Year 1. Thus, Sam’s percentage right to
capital would be 79% and Claire’s would be 21%. Table 10 summarizes
the results obtained for each of the four factors.
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Table 10
Factors Summary:
Partnership with Target Allocations
Factor
Relative Contributions
Interests in Profits and Losses
Interests in Cash Flow
Rights to Capital upon Liquidation

Sam
80%
74%
25–74%
79%

Claire
20%
26%
26–55%
21%

Based on this information, the partnership must allocate the tax items
to the partners and determine whether they are in accordance with the
partners’ interests in the partnership. If the allocations are within the
range set forth in Table 10, the IRS should respect the allocations. The
analysis raises two problems however. First, the analysis does not
establish the extent to which the partners must allocate specific tax
items, such as tax income and the depreciation deduction. As with other
scenarios, they may be able to allocate those items to reduce the
partners’ aggregate tax liability. Second, the analysis uses historical
cost. The partnership’s actual residual value at the end of Year 1 was
$1,030,000. 205 If the analysis had used that figure, the results would
have varied. As time passes and historical cost and actual values likely
deviate, the variance of results would increase. The results derived
using market value would return more accurate values. Using historical
values could lead to allocations that do not reflect reality. Partnerships
with target allocations thus raise very complicated tax issues.
In fact, economic theory of entity classification suggests that tax law
should not treat partnerships with target allocations as tax
partnerships. 206 Economically, a partnership with target allocations is
like a corporation with multiple classes of stock. 207 Corporations with
complex capital structures cannot trace the income of the corporation to
a specific shareholder and therefore require the corporate tax regime. 208
Because partnerships with target allocations face a similar problem, tax
law should treat partnerships with target allocations as tax
corporations. 209 Nonetheless, the current definition of a tax corporation
does not include partnerships that make target allocations. 210 The
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra p. 1086, Table 3.
See Borden, supra note 35, at 286–94.
See id. at 275–78.
See id.
See id. at 286–91.
A partnership may, however, elect to be a tax corporation. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a)
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example of Samaire Partnership using target allocations further
illustrates a needed change in the law.
These several examples illustrate that the current version and use of
partners’ interests in a partnership does not work. Partners in even the
simplest partnerships will have difficulty determining their interests in
the partnership under the current definition. The factors are filled with
ambiguity and other shortcomings, and they beg the question of how
such poor rules could end up in the regulations. One or more of three
possible reasons may explain the regulations’ inadequacies. First,
Treasury may have been lazy in drafting the rules. That is highly
unlikely because Treasury is staffed with some of the country’s best and
most conscientious tax lawyers.
Second, the drafters of rules may have believed at the time of drafting
that the concept of partners’ interests in a partnership is intuitive. They
may have thus provided a mere skeletal outline of the rules and left the
rest to common knowledge and practice. That would explain part of the
allure of the concept, but over time practitioners focus on the literal
language of the rules and begin to exploit weaknesses in the rules.
Third, the concept may simply be illusory, and despite its allure as a tool
fit for allocation rules, drafting a workable definition is impossible. This
Article claims that a combination of the second and third explanations
capture reality. That reality suggests the rules are ripe for fundamental
reform.
IV. PROPOSAL: FUNDAMENTALLY REFORM PARTNERSHIP TAX
ALLOCATION RULES
At first blush, partners’ interests in a partnership are an alluring tool
for allocating tax items. The above examination of the concept reveals,
however, that it is illusory—one cannot determine partners’ interests in a
partnership. Because of the problems inherent in the current system, this
Article recommends fundamental reform to the partnership allocation
rules in general and the reliance on partners’ interests in particular.
Such reform is needed for two reasons. First, allocations made pursuant
to the tax-centric economic-effect safe harbor generate legal economic
consequences that may surprise even the most sophisticated partners and
tax advisors. Second, because partners’ interests in a partnership is an
illusory concept, its use will cause problems. In particular, the use of the
concept may prevent the IRS from successfully challenging tax-item
allocations that dissociate corresponding tax and economic items with
(as amended in 2006). Assuming the partners are rational, a partnership would make that election only
if it provided the partners with a tax advantage.
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tax-item transactions. Taxpayers appear to understand the leniency of
the partnership tax allocation rules. Two case studies suggest taxpayers
of all sizes engage in such practices, and their efforts potentially affect
billions of dollars of tax revenue.
Shortly before the publication of this Article, the author spoke with an
attorney who represents the tax-exempt foundation of a small state
university. The foundation owns a piece of real property. A developer
proposed a partnership with the foundation. The partnership would
borrow $20 million, construct a building on the foundation’s property,
and rent it out. For the first several years, the partnership’s cash flow
would break even, but it would have taxable income. The developer
recommended that the partnership allocate the taxable income to the taxexempt foundation until the partnership generated positive cash flow and
began making distributions. The developer’s plan was to allocate
taxable income to an entity that did not pay tax, thereby reducing the
aggregate tax liability of the partners. 211 The developer claimed that the
arrangement was simple and similar to other arrangements the developer
was part of. If the plan would work, it illustrates an abuse of the rules,
but the IRS may hesitate to challenge the strategy under the current
allocation rules.
A tax shelter case illustrates the IRS’s reluctance to challenge the
validity of allocations. Several years ago, two tax-neutral Dutch
banks—ING Bank N.V. and Rabo Merchant Bank N.V.—and a
subsidiary of GE Capital Corporation entered into an arrangement to
acquire and dispose of financial instruments. 212 The arrangement
provided a fixed-rate of return to the banks and arguably no real non-tax
economic benefits to the GE subsidiary. 213 The parties agreed to
allocate most of the taxable income to the tax-exempt foreign banks. 214
The arrangement would appear to violate the underlying principle of the
test for substantiality, 215 but the Second Circuit did not consider the

211. Unless the income the partnership would generate was related to the foundation’s tax-exempt
purpose, the income allocated to the foundation would be unrelated business taxable income. See
BRADLEY T. BORDEN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS BY TAX-EXEMPT ENTITIES: PORTFOLIO 591 (2d ed.
2008). Thus, the developer’s plan would fail to accomplish its purposes if the partnership’s income did
not relate to the foundations tax-exempt purposes. Even if the plan ultimately would not achieve the
developer’s objective, the anecdote illustrates the types of strategies taxpayers attempt to employ using
the partnership allocation rules.
212. See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 2006).
213. See id. at 226–27.
214. See id.
215. Indeed, this is the argument the IRS made at the trial court, but the court rejected it. See
TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94, 117–21 (D. Conn. 2004), rev’d, 459 F.3d 220 (2d
Cir. 2006).
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validity of the allocations on appeal. 216 Instead, it considered the
classification of the arrangement (one of the most difficult questions in
tax law 217 ), and ruled the taxpayer owed $62 million of taxes because
the arrangement was not a tax partnership. 218 The IRS’s position
suggests that the allocation rules’ deficiencies make them unreliable and
perhaps unenforceable.
These two anecdotes provide further evidence that allocation rules are
ready for reform. The reform must consider the argument presented in
favor of the current tax-centric tax-item allocation rules. That argument
is that the current rules promote efficiency by allowing transactions that
will attract parties to partnerships. 219 The argument fails, however, to
recognize the difference between tax laws that do not interfere with
economic transactions and those that promote abusive tax avoidance.
Recall from the discussion above that partners allocate economic items
for various reasons, including reducing agency costs. 220 For example, to
help reduce agency costs, Sam and Claire may decide to allocate
partnership operating profit using one ratio and allocate gains or losses
from the disposition of property using a different ratio. 221 A tax law that
alters their decision to allocate the economic items in that manner could
be inefficient because it would distort the partners’ behavior. 222
Distorted behavior is a negative consequence that derives from
regulating the allocation of economic items.
Tax policy does not suggest, however, that the partners should be able
to allocate tax items freely. Here, the distinction between tax items and
economic items is important. Tax law should attempt to match tax-item
allocations to economic-item allocations whenever possible. Tax law
should regulate tax-item allocations to help accomplish that purpose.
Such regulation should not adversely affect the economic behavior of
partners. The following discussion considers alternative modifications
216. See TIFD III-E, Inc., 459 F.3d at 224, n.1.
217. See WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
¶ 3.01 (3d ed. 2004) (“The most basic, and perhaps the most difficult, problem in the taxation of
partnerships and partners is the determination whether a particular . . . arrangement constitutes a
partnership for income tax purposes.”).
218. See TIFD III-E, Inc., 459 F.3d at 224 (identifying the tax liability), 241 (holding that the
Dutch banks did not have an equity interest in the arrangement).
219. See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones, Towards Equity and Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 VA.
TAX REV. 1047, 1078–93 (2006) (discussing and referencing different arguments for and against
flexibility in partnership allocations).
220. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
221. See id.
222. See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 331 (8th ed. 2008) (defining
inefficiency as a distortion in economic behavior caused a tax that creates a loss of welfare above and
beyond the tax revenues collected).
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to the partnership tax-item allocation rules. It recommends avoiding or
rejecting two of the alternatives and embracing the third.
A. Abandon Tax-Centric Allocation Rules
One alternative is to require all partnerships to comply with the
economic-effect safe harbor. 223 This alternative would be attractive to
many tax lawyers and academics because they are familiar with the
capital account maintenance rules. Requiring all partnerships to adopt
capital accounts would appear to create uniformity and provide rules
with which a significant portion of the tax lawyers are familiar.
Nonetheless, the costs of mandatory capital account maintenance would
exceed the benefits such a rule may bestow.
First, default partnerships will not include capital accounts. Two or
more persons may join together in a profit-seeking activity and not
realize they have formed a partnership. 224 If the partners do not realize
they are forming a partnership, certainly they would not include capital
account maintenance provisions in their partnership agreement.
Similarly taxpayers who knowingly form a partnership may not possess
the tax sophistication required to include capital account maintenance
provisions in their partnership agreement. Penalizing unsophisticated
taxpayers for that oversight would be draconian. Partnerships are
ancient business structures, 225 and tax law cannot stop their formation
and should not impede or penalize their use.
Second, sophisticated taxpayers may prefer not to use the economiceffect safe harbor because it allocates economic items based upon the
allocation of tax items. The partners may fear the unintended
consequences of such allocations. No one can predict all of the
economic consequences that will proceed from using the safe harbor.
Therefore, many partners may choose not to use the tax law’s capital
account maintenance rules to avoid possible negative legal
consequences. Forcing sophisticated taxpayers to adopt the rules would
impose an unduly harsh requirement on them.
Third, because the capital account rules are tax-centric, they may
misrepresent the partners’ preferred economic arrangement.
In
particular, independent tax items have no corresponding economic item,

223. See supra text accompanying notes 99–109 (discussing the economic-effect safe harbor and
the Section 704(b) capital account rules).
224. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 66, § 2.02 (discussing different contexts in which the
question of partnership status arises).
225. See, e.g., Henry Fr. Lutz, Babylonian Partnerships, 4 J. ECON. & BUS. HIST. 552, 558–65
(1932) (describing the origin of partnerships in Babylonian society).
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so tax law creates fictitious economic items to adjust capital accounts. 226
Mandatory use of the rules could distort behavior as partners attempt to
obtain a desired economic outcome while working with rules that do not
accurately portray their economic arrangement. For example, if
adjustments to capital accounts for the depreciation deduction alter the
partners’ economic arrangement, the partners may allocate other tax
items to offset the depreciation-deduction allocation. Such offsetting
allocations could be similar to the complex allocations of the built-in
gain or loss of contributed property. 227 Requiring partners to use taxcentric allocation methods may impose unnecessary complexity on
arrangements that partners would otherwise manage simply.
Fourth, if tax law could overcome all of those shortcomings, the
mandatory use of capital accounts would still face the problems raised
by the test for substantiality. If all partnerships adopt the capital account
rules, their allocations would have economic effect, but partners may
still use the allocation to reduce the partners’ aggregate tax liability. As
discussed above, partners must test the validity of their tax-item
allocations by comparing those allocations to allocations that would be
made in accordance with partners’ interests in the partnership. 228 Thus,
if the law adopted mandatory use of the capital account rules, it would
still have to address the illusion of the concept of partners’ interests in
the partnership.
Finally, tax law should not force all partnerships to abide by rules that
allocate economic items. Ultimately, state law governs the allocation of
the partnership’s economic items and determines the partners’ economic
interests in the partnership. Tax law could impose penalties for failure
to use capital accounts, but it would still be left with the task of
allocating tax items for unsophisticated partners. The penalties also
would create economic inefficiency as partners would have to alter their
economic arrangement to avoid the penalties. As a consequence, tax
law will always have the task of considering the validity of agreed-upon
allocations and of allocating tax items for partnerships that do not
include relevant allocation provisions in their agreements.
Tax-centric allocations will not solve the problems inherent in the
current rules, so mandating the use of capital accounts will not resolve
those problems. Thus, mandatory capital accounts do not appear to be a
226. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), ex. 1 (as amended in 2008); supra text accompanying notes
100–109.
227. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3 (as amended in 2005); see generally
Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K: Substance, Shattered Ceilings and the Problem of Contributed
Property, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (2009) (discussing the rules governing the allocation of built-in gain
and loss).
228. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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Instead, the rules must

B. Abandon the Concept of Partners’ Interests in a Partnership
Another alternative is to modify the current rules and develop a
formula for determining a universal concept of partners’ interests in a
partnership. 229 For example, some may consider multiple variable
integration that incorporates all relevant factors into a single formula.
Such an undertaking would be extremely difficult and would likely
prove futile. To develop a universal concept using the four factors, for
example, the law would have to accurately define the key terms of each
factor, resolve the problem of factor overlap, and provide weight for the
factors. Each of those tasks would present a significant challenge.
To accurately determine the partners’ interests in the partnership, the
partners would also need accurate information about the value of the
partnership’s assets. 230 To make allocations on an annual basis, the
partners would have to gather information each year. Often perfect
information regarding the value of partnership assets is not available or
would be costly to obtain.
Finally, a universal concept of the partners’ interests in a partnership
may not accurately reflect the partners’ economic arrangement.
Partnerships generally have allocation-dependent residual risk, meaning
the partners determine their residual claims in the partnership by
considering the allocations of partnership economic items. 231
Partnerships may allocate different economic items to different partners
in different ratios.232 Merely considering the partners’ residual claims in
the partnership assets will not accurately reflect the character of specific
economic-item allocations. For example, if the partners allocate profit
and fluctuations in the value of partnership property differently, a
universal concept of partners’ interests in the partnership will not
capture that distinction. 233 Thus, allocating tax items using a universal
concept may not match tax items with economic-item allocations. The
solution must adopt an item-specific concept.

229. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 TAX L. REV. 1,
40 (1990) (recommending that tax items be allocated in accordance with the relative values of capital
accounts).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 121–123 (illustrating that historical costs and actual
values return different unitary economic interests for the partners).
231. See Borden, supra note 35, at 273–75.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 182–186.
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C. Adopt Item-Specific Economic-Centric Allocation Rules
The inadequacies of the current rules and other alternatives lead to
item-specific economic-centric allocations. Item-specific economiccentric allocations accomplish several feats. First, they require tax items
to follow the allocation of economic items, so tax-item allocations will
not affect the partners’ rights and obligations. Second, item-specific
allocations recognize the partners’ particular allocations of economic
items.
Third, item-specific allocations work with any type of
partnership that has allocation-dependent residual risk. 234
Economic-centric allocations of tax items reflect general principles of
taxation better than the current tax-centric allocations. Part I of this
Article demonstrated that tax law generally considers the flow of
economic items from the transaction and requires tax items to follow the
economic items. 235 The use of a partnership structure should not alter
the application of that principle. Thus, the partner to whom an economic
item is allocated should recognize the corresponding tax item. 236
Economic-centric allocations help ensure that happens.
Item-specific economic-centric allocations of tax items would give
tax law the flexibility needed to anticipate the various economic
arrangements partners may adopt. An example helps illustrate this
point. Recall that in one scenario Sam and Claire agreed to allocate
profit 55% to Claire and 45% to Sam. 237 The partnership’s tax income
corresponds with its profit, so item-specific economic-centric allocation
rules would require the partnership to allocate 55% of the tax income to
Claire and 45% to Sam. If the partners failed to allocate economic items
in their partnership agreement, state default rules would allocate those
items.
Economic-centric tax-item allocations would require the
corresponding tax items to follow the allocation of the economic items.
Thus, if state law allocated operating profits equally to the partners, tax
234. As demonstrated earlier, partnership tax law will never adequately account for partnerships
with distribution-dependent residual risk, such as those with target allocations. See supra Part III.C.5;
Borden, supra note 35, at 286–91.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 21–26 (who earned the corresponding economic income);
Lusthaus v. Comm’r, 327 U.S. 293, 295–97 (1946) (rejecting a sham partnership formed to shift income
between a husband and wife); Comm’r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291–92 (1946) (holding that no
meaningful partnership existed between a husband and wife and disregarding the allocation of income
from the husband to the wife).
236. In the case of tax-exempt income or non-deductible expenditures, tax law adjusts the
partners’ bases in the partnership to preserve the tax effect. See I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(B), (2)(B) (2006).
The tax treatment does not affect the allocation of the corresponding economic item, unless the partners
have adopted the Section 704(b) capital account rules, which require the partners to adjust capital
accounts for allocations of tax-exempt income and non-deductible expenditures. Treas. Reg. § 1.7041(b)(2)(iv)(b)(3), (6) (as amended in 2008).
237. See supra Part III.C.3.
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law should allocate the corresponding tax item equally to the partners.
One challenge item-specific economic-centric allocations face is the
allocation of independent tax items. Independent tax items, such as
depreciation deductions, have no economic items to follow. Thus, tax
law must deal with them specially. Simply granting the partners
discretion to allocate the independent items does not seem appropriate.
Some partners would abuse such freedom and enter into tax-item
transactions or other tax-revenue-reducing arrangements. Consequently,
tax law must govern the allocation of independent tax items.
To consider a rule that allocates independent tax items, recall how tax
law treats an individual who owns depreciable property. Tax law allows
the owner of certain property used in a trade or business or held for
production of income to take a depreciation deduction for the
property. 238 The purpose of the depreciation deduction appears to be to
allow the property owner to deduct the cost of the property capitalized
on acquisition. 239 Upon disposition of the property, the owner must
recapture the depreciation deduction. 240 A property owner who is
entitled to a depreciation deduction may not assign that deduction or the
depreciation recapture to another party. 241 For example, if Sam owned a
building individually, Claire could not claim the depreciation deduction
for the building. Only Sam, the owner of the building, could claim the
deduction. Later, if Sam sold the building, Sam would recapture the
depreciation. 242 Partnership tax law should strive to achieve a similar
result.
With respect to the allocation of depreciation deductions, partnership
rules should require the allocation of depreciation based upon the
partners’ indirect ownership of the depreciable property. Partners
indirectly co-own partnership property. 243 Thus, they each should report
a portion of the depreciation deduction associated with the partnership’s
depreciable property. Tax law should require the partners to allocate the
partnership’s depreciation deduction in accordance with their indirect
238. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (2006).
239. See BRIAN E. COMERFORD & MASON J. SACKS, FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTIONS 404 (1983) (“It
is reasonably clear, however, that even in the beginning, Congress intended merely that the deduction
for depreciation permit a taxpayer to recover its investment in a capital asset. The deduction is not
designed either to permit a taxpayer to match income and expense, since the income generated by the
asset is ignored, or to enable a taxpayer to replace an obsolete asset, as replacement cost is also
ignored.”).
240. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(D), 1245(a) (2006).
241. See Borden, supra note 52, at 329–32.
242. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(D) (2006).
243. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 61 (2001) (defining partnership as
a co-ownership arrangement). But see UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 203 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 96 (2001)
(providing that the partnership, not the partners, owns the partnership property).
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ownership interests in the partnership property. The partners’ indirect
ownership interests in the partnership property may not be obvious.
Factors such as the partners’ capital contributions, income-sharing
arrangements related to the property, and their sharing of fluctuations in
the property’s value indicate the partners’ indirect ownership interests in
the partnership property. Those factors may vary over time and the ratio
of each with respect to various properties may differ. Relying on such
factors alone will therefore not completely solve the problem. 244
The law could allow partners to determine their indirect interests in
the partnership property based upon relevant factors related to the
property. If the partners’ determination is reasonable based upon the
factors above, the law should respect the determination. If the partners
fail to establish their indirect interests, tax law could defer to the state
default allocation rules to establish those interests. The law should also
require that the partner to whom depreciation is allocated must recognize
depreciation recapture when the partnership disposes of the property in a
taxable transaction. The allocation of depreciation recapture to the
partner who took the depreciation deduction will help minimize abusive
allocations of the depreciation deduction. The use of indirect interests
may not eliminate all potential for abuse, but it will require reasonable,
uniform allocations of independent tax items. Such rules will also help
allocate hybrid tax items such as taxable gain or loss.
Consider how item-specific economic-centric rules might allocate
depreciation deductions to Sam and Claire in the partnership with
specially-allocated economic items. The rules would allocate the
depreciation deduction based upon the partners’ indirect ownership
interests in the partnership property. Their indirect ownership interests
would relate to economic items associated with the property, such as
fluctuations in the property’s value. Recall that they agreed to allocate
fluctuations in the value of the property 65% to Sam and 35% to
Claire. 245
The partnership’s only asset is the property, so the
partnership’s profits are also associated with the property. The partners
allocate profit 45% to Sam and 55% to Claire. 246 Based upon the
allocation of those two economic items, Sam and Claire would have to
reasonably establish their indirect ownership interests in the property.
Taking into account each partner’s contributions as well, any allocation
between 45% and 80% for Sam and between 20% and 55% for Claire
would appear to be reasonable. The interests they establish will apply to
all depreciation deductions associated with the property.
244. See supra Part III.
245. See supra Part III.C.3.
246. See id.
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Assume that Sam and Claire agree that Sam’s indirect ownership
interest is 60% and Claire’s is 40%. Based on those interests, they
would allocate the depreciation deduction 60% to Sam and 40% to
Claire. Over the first three years, the partnership would have $60,000 of
depreciation deductions and allocate $36,000 or 60% to Sam and
$24,000 or 40% to Claire. That tax-item allocation would not affect the
allocation of economic items.
Now consider the allocation of gain on the disposition of the property
at the end of Year 3. Assume Samaire Partnership sells the property for
$1,088,000, its fair market value. The partnership would recognize
$148,000 of gain on the disposition. 247 Sam and Claire agreed to
allocate the $88,000 of increased value (an economic item) 65% or
$57,200 to Sam and 35% or $30,800 to Claire. $88,000 of the gain (a
tax item) corresponds to the increase in the property’s value (an
economic item), so they should allocate that portion of the gain 65% to
Sam and 35% to Claire. In that manner, the tax item follows the
economic item.
The remaining $60,000 of gain is depreciation recapture attributable
to the depreciation deductions. The partnership should allocate the
recapture in the same ratio that it allocated the depreciation deductions.
Therefore, it should allocate 60% or $36,000 of the recapture to Sam and
40% or $24,000 to Claire. These allocations ensure that corresponding
tax items follow economic items and that the allocations of independent
tax items follow a reasonable allocation. The tax-item allocations
should not distort taxpayer behavior, and they would not affect the
partners’ rights and obligations in the partnership.
Tax law would also have to develop similar rules or standards for
allocating other independent tax items. Such rules may not be perfect.
Nonetheless, they would more closely reflect the general rules of income
tax. They would also help reduce abuse by requiring the partners to
determine their interests in partnership property (or other relevant
factors) and use those determined interests to allocate tax items
consistently. Item-specific allocations also eliminate abusive allocations
of corresponding tax items by preventing the dissociation of
corresponding tax items from economic items.
Item-specific economic-centric allocations would not require capital
accounts. Partners may use capital accounts to report a monetary value
for their legal rights and obligations in the partnership, but tax-item
allocations would not affect those accounts. Tax law could therefore

247. The gain is based upon partnership’s adjusted basis of $940,000, the $1,000,000 cost minus
the $60,000 depreciation. See I.R.C. § 1011(a) (2006).
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eliminate economic-effect safe harbor. Eliminating those rules would
stop the unintended consequences that currently derive from their taxcentric nature. Consequently, tax-item allocations would not have legal
or economic consequences and would not affect the partners’ economic
interests in the partnership. In short, item-specific economic-centric taxitem allocations would appear to solve many of the problems of the
current system.
CONCLUSION
Partnership tax law has the significant burden of allocating tax items
to the partners. The complex nature of partnerships makes that a
difficult task. Tax law has dealt with that task by granting significant
leeway to partners in allocating tax items, as long as those allocations
come within the economic-effect safe harbor. The IRS may, however,
challenge allocations made pursuant to the economic-effect safe harbor
by comparing them to allocations that the partnership would have made
in accordance with partners’ interests in the partnership. The IRS may
reallocate invalid allocations in accordance with partners’ interests in the
partnership. Allocations that do not come within the economic-effect
safe harbor must be in accordance with partners’ interests in the
partnership. Therefore, partners’ interests in a partnership are a critical
aspect of the current allocation rules.
Considering allocations made in accordance with partners’ interests in
the partnership has visceral appeal. The concept sounds so intuitive that
such allocations would appear to be obvious. This Article demonstrates,
however, that the concept of partners’ interests in a partnership is
illusory. Its use in the allocation rules creates serious problems,
including opening the door for abusive allocations. Such allocations
could remove billions of dollars from federal tax revenue. This Article
therefore suggests that tax law should abandon its use.
Tax law should require the allocation of corresponding tax items to
follow corresponding economic-item allocations and require the
allocation of independent tax items to tie-in with an economic aspect of
the partnership that relates to the tax item. Such a rule would more
closely reflect general principles of taxation and not affect the partners’
economic interests in the partnership. Finally, such a rule would help
eliminate ambiguity as well as reduce abusive tax practices and traps for
unsophisticated taxpayers. The result would be item-specific economiccentric rules that recognize and follow the partners’ economic
arrangements. Such rules would represent a fundamental change in
partnership taxation, but the change is in the best interests of the tax
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system and the vast majority of taxpayers.
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